Development of a framework to leverage knowledge management systems to improve security awareness. by Lupiana, Dennis
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Dissertations School of Computing 
2008-01-01 
Development of a framework to leverage knowledge management 
systems to improve security awareness. 
Dennis Lupiana 
Technological University Dublin, brendan.tierney@tudublin.ie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/scschcomdis 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lupiana, Dennis, "Development of a framework to leverage knowledge management systems to improve 
security awareness." (2008). Dissertations. 6. 
https://arrow.tudublin.ie/scschcomdis/6 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open 
access by the School of Computing at ARROW@TU 
Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations 
by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. 
For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
      
 
 
Development of a Framework to 
Leverage Knowledge Management 









A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
Dublin Institute of Technology for the degree of  











I certify that this dissertation which I now submit for examination for the award of 
MSc in Computing (Knowledge Management), is entirely my own work and has not 
been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been 
cited and acknowledged within the test of my work. 
 
This dissertation was prepared according to the regulations for postgraduate study of 
the Dublin Institute of Technology and has not been submitted in whole or part for an 
award in any other Institute or University. 
 
The work reported on in this dissertation conforms to the principles and requirements 




Signed:   _________________________________ 
 
 
Date:     08th September 2008 
 
   ii
ABSTRACT 
Security awareness is very essential in securing intellectual property, in particular 
internal corporate information assets and its “Knowledge”. The dynamic nature of 
security attacks and the need to comply with government policies in protecting 
organisation’s data has a major influence on seeing organisations focus on 
strengthening against threats from the human element. This is a difficult challenge. 
Organisations must have a degree of trust their employees. They must trust their 
employees to interact responsibly as end-users with their information systems. They 
must trust their employees who work as developers to work responsibly and be 
motivated to develop systems with the organisations protection in mind. However 
organisations cannot expect all its employees to be educated in security issues before 
joining the organisation and therefore must take some responsibility for educating both 
users and developers on security issues and ethics. Although many organisations do 
have security policies and awareness programmes, many others don’t. Security 
awareness programmes and policies have varying degrees of success. Therefore the 
issue of how to improve the security awareness of all employees in organisations, and 
end-users in particular, is a hot topic.  
 
The project described in this dissertation identified user involvement in highlighting 
and protecting against security-relevant issues as crucial to ensuring privacy and 
security of organisational knowledge and corporate information assets. This project 
investigated how to harness the power of users by developing a framework from which 
a knowledge management system (KMS) was developed that provides a participatory 
education approach to security issues. The results of an extensive literature review and 
the views of security experts and non-experts were used to develop a web based 
prototype KMS which was evaluated by a group of academic users in higher 
educational institute in Tanzania. The results of this evaluation were then distributed to 
security experts and top executives for assessment of using such a KMS to improve 
security user awareness across the organisation.  
 
Key words: Computer Systems Security, Security Awareness, Knowledge Management, 
KMS, KMS-SAWA Framework and Prototype. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Organisational information architectures are becoming increasingly more complex. 
This need for complexity introduces more bugs that can be exploited to breach 
corporate security. High demand for system interoperability and so called user friendly 
interfaces has introduced a new layer of threats and attacks to modern information 
systems architectures. In addition, the openness of Internet has brought new challenges 
in protecting organisations’ intellectual property and information assets (Herold 2005). 
Organisations are also constantly busy acquiring the so called sophisticated security 
tools and applications to fight against these threats (D'Arcy & Hovav 2007). However, 
technology is unpredictable parameter and relying on technological assistance for 
security is not sufficient. The focus should be wider and the least organisations can do 
to control information systems security is to interweave what they already know, 
knowledge sharing, to assist with improving organisational security informing all 
members of the organisation. 
 
The tight technological security controls that are being deployed within organisations 
have changed attackers’ attention to end-users who are mostly not aware or ignorant of 
security measures (Smith 2003). Though software developers also pose a big threat in 
computer security, this dissertation will only concentrate with end-users. With 
software security paradigm, developers are much away in security ethics than end-
users (McGraw 2004). Therefore, in this dissertation end-users are considered more 
susceptible and therefore pose a significant point of danger when considering 
protecting organisations’ intellectual property and information assets. To at least 
control the danger from the growing nature of digital threats, increased focus should be 
directed to human element, in particular end-users. Good users’ understanding on 
security principles is a stepping stone for the successfulness of security measures and 
organisation as well (Arce 2003; Trcek 2006). 
 
However it is not as simple as just introducing education programme, the challenges 
remain on how to determine what users require to be aware of, and how to integrate 
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and make accessible security experts’ knowledge to all end-users within the 
organisation without affecting their productivity. The approach adopted in this project 
builds on the definition that Knowledge Management System (KMS) is an information 
system that aims to facilitate the codification, collection, integration, and 
dissemination of organisational knowledge (Bernard 2006). As such the project aims to 
investigate where using a KMS could assist with improving security awareness. In this 
dissertation, the KMS developed plays dual roles, firstly to store and communicate 
security related knowledge contents and secondly to allow users to compare their 
security-relevant activities with security policies and to either suggest on security 
policy amendments or additions to training programmes.  
1.2 Research problem  
Many researchers emphasise on the involvement of employees in security awareness 
programme (Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver 2002; Desman 2002; Herold 2005). On the 
other hand, central to the improvement of organisational performance is employees’ 
contributions.  
 
Therefore, since KM recognises the contributions employees have in improving 
organisational performance, this project will investigate possible KM processes and 
KMS features to improve organisational security awareness. 
 
The primary aim of this project was to investigate users’ awareness in security issues 
and the usefulness of KMS in improving security user awareness thereafter to develop 
a framework that leverages KMS in improving security awareness in an organisational 
context. From this framework a prototype KMS is developed. 
1.3 Intellectual challenge  
To achieve the aim of this project, an investigation of the roles of users play in 
computer security and security awareness was necessary so as to build insights on the 
trend of computer threats as associated with users, and the efforts organisations 
undertake to equip their users with necessary skills to fight against these threats. 
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Moreover, an investigation on Knowledge Management was conducted to ascertain the 
possible knowledge activities that are appropriate in improving users’ awareness in 
computer security related issues and the fundamental characteristics of KMS, their 
usage and implementation requirements. An investigation of KMS was conducted to 
assess their feasibility in improving security awareness in an organisational context. 
Following this investigation, appropriate features of KMS were highlighted for the 
improvement of users’ security awareness.  
 
Finally, building on highlighted features of KMS, a Wiki based prototype was 
developed to assess the contributions of KMS in improving users’ security awareness. 
1.4 Research objectives 
The following objectives have been achieved throughout the dissertation and 
contributed to the overall outcome: 
 
1. Review of computer security and security awareness approaches. 
An extensive literature review of computer security and security awareness 
approaches was conducted to analyse the trend of computer threats regarding to 
users and the efforts organisations undertook in educating users. 
2. Investigate users’ involvement in computer security. 
An investigation of users’ involvement in computer security was conducted to 
analyse the roles users play in computer security. To accomplish this, the survey 
was created based on the results of a literature review of computer security and 
security awareness. 
3. Investigate Knowledge Management and KMS. 
An extensive literature review on Knowledge Management and KMS was 
conducted to analyse their feasibility in improving security awareness. 
4. Develop a  framework for implementing KMS to improve security 
awareness 
An open framework was developed to assist organisations when implementing 
KMS to improve security awareness. The framework was evaluated by security 
experts to analyse its applicability within an organisational context. 
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5. Develop and evaluate a Knowledge Management System prototype. 
A Wiki based KMS was developed to assess the contributions of KMS in 
improving security awareness. The prototype was then evaluated by both 
security experts and end-users.  
1.5 Research methodology  
To successful accomplish the above objectives both primary and secondary research 
was conducted. Primary research included both questionnaires and interviews. 
Secondary research concentrated on extensive literature review. 
 
Beginning with the secondary research, an extensive literature review was conducted 
in the field of computer security and security awareness to investigate current 
situations on computer threats as associated with users and the efforts organisations 
undertake to educate their users. 
 
Following the results obtained from the literature review of computer security and 
security awareness, a primary research was conducted to investigate the roles users 
play in computer security and the contributions of current security awareness 
programmes into educating users. 
 
This primary research was questionnaire-based survey covering many countries in the 
world. The targeted audiences were security experts and organisational users. The 
survey involved both physical distribution of questionnaires and online survey. 
Thereafter an interview with security experts was conducted to evaluate the findings. 
 
Parallel to security awareness survey, an extensive literature review on Knowledge 
Management and KMS was also conducted to ascertain appropriate knowledge 
management activities and key features of KMS that can be useful in improving 
security awareness. 
 
Following the results from literature reviews and security awareness survey, security 
awareness was mapped as a knowledge management problem. Thereafter, a framework 
was developed to guide organisations in building KMS for improving security 
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awareness.  To evaluate the applicability of the framework, an interview with security 
experts was conducted.  
 
Finally, a KMS prototype was developed using Wiki collaborative tool. Security 
experts were invited to evaluate its implementation process by suggesting on the look 
and feel of its contents. Thereafter users, specifically from Africa, were invited to 
participate in the Wiki for a period of two weeks and thereafter to evaluate its 
contribution on users’ understanding on computer security issues. 
1.6 Resources  
To successful accomplish this project both technical and non-technical resources were 
essential. Below is the list and briefly explanation of each category: 
 Technical resources  
1. Personal computer 
Availability of personal computer, specifically laptop, with full installed word 
processing and analytical applications was essential for the documentation of 
this dissertation. 
2. Online survey tool 
Accessibility of online survey tool, http://www.group-surveys.com, was also 
essential in successful accomplishment of this project. The tool was useful in 
conducting online survey. 
3. Online Wiki tool 
Accessibility of online Wiki tool, http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com, was necessary 
for the successful accomplishment of this project. The tool was useful on the 
development of Knowledge Management System prototype.  
4. Internet access 
Accessibility to internet was vital on the completion of this project. Besides its 
facilitation in literature survey, internet acted as focal resource for the 
successful completion of this project. Firstly, it assisted in routine 
communications with project supervisor, and security experts. It also acted as 
access point for online survey and Wiki tools. 
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 Non-technical resources 
1. Library access 
Access to library facilities was necessary for the successful completion of this 
project for conducting extensive literature survey. This included both physical 
and online accessibility. Physical accessibility was for literature reviewing on 
books and previous dissertations, while online was useful for accessibility of 
electronic journals. 
2. Industrial contacts  
Accessibility of industrial contacts for security experts was necessary 
throughout this project to assist in the evaluation of survey results, framework 
and KM System prototype. 
3. Project Supervisor 
Accessibility to project supervisor was vital for successful completion of this 
project. Project Supervisor was on the centre of this project by providing access 
to security experts who played central role in this project. Moreover, project 
supervisor provided assistance in coherence of the document. 
1.7 Scope  and  lim itations  
The world is so large and is made up of different organisations with different cultures. 
Finding the true view of security awareness of all organisations could involve an 
extensive survey and interviews. However, due to time limitation this project focused 
on a subset of security experts who were accessible and users in Ireland and East 
Africa. Although the findings cannot be considered definitive for every organisation 
they still can be considered interesting and useful for those interested in assessing their 
security awareness. In addition it offers new insights into the current state of security 




   7
1.8 Organisation of  the dissertation  
The remaining chapters of this research project are organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 discusses computer systems security. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the trend of computer security threats and their control measures related to 
users. The chapter starts by the introduction of the chapter then followed by the 
discussion of computer systems background. The third section provides the discussion 
of three key issues in computer systems security. The fourth section provides the 
discussion of computer systems threats. The last section provides a discussion of three 
computer systems security controls; technical, management and institutionalisation. 
The chapter concludes by outlining users’ influences in ensuring computer security and 
the effects of technological control measures. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on security awareness. The aim of this chapter is to investigate 
current security awareness programmes and the involvement of users. The chapter 
starts by the introduction of the chapter then followed by the definition of security user 
awareness. The third section provides security awareness building process followed by 
the discussion of current security awareness approaches. The fifth section provides the 
discussion of security awareness in Ireland followed by the security awareness in 
Tanzania. The last section provides the review on the failure of the current security 
awareness.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on knowledge management systems. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate key processes of knowledge management and appropriate features of KMS 
in improving security awareness. The chapter starts by introducing the chapter then 
followed by the discussion of knowledge management. The discussion of 
organisational learning will be provided in section three. Section four provides the 
discussion of computing for knowledge management. The discussion about KMS will 
be provided in the fifth section. The chapter concludes by highlighting key knowledge 
management processes and key KMS features that can be useful in improving security 
awareness in an organisational context.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on knowledge management perspectives on security awareness.  The 
aim of this chapter is to show how KMS can be useful in improving security 
awareness. The chapter starts by the introduction of the chapter then followed by the 
explanation of why security awareness is a knowledge management problem. The third 
section provides the discussion of organisational security culture where NIST learning 
continuum and Microsoft security learning cycle will be discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 provides security awareness survey. The aim of this chapter is to investigate 
the roles users play in computer security and the effectiveness of current security 
awareness programmes. The chapter starts by introducing the chapter then followed by 
the discussion of audiences. The third section provides the discussion of survey 
methodology. Questionnaire design will be explained in the fourth section followed by 
the survey results analysis on the fifth section. The sixth section describes supporting 
interviews then followed by summary of the findings. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the level of users’ involvement in security issues and the effectiveness of 
current security awareness programmes. 
 
Chapter 7 describes the KMS-SAWA framework and prototype implementation and 
evaluation process. The chapter will be introduced before the discussion on the factors 
for the KMS implementation for security awareness. The third section provides the 
discussion of initial KMS-SAWA framework. The fourth section will provide the 
KMS-SAWA framework descriptions. Prototype implementation will be described in 
the fifth section followed by its evaluation process in the sixth section. The chapter 
concludes by outlining the key benefits of KMS-SAWA framework and KMS has in 
improving security awareness. 
 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion of the dissertation. The aim of this chapter is to give the 
reader an overview of the research project by pointing out key elements and suggesting 
future work. The chapter starts by introducing the chapter then followed by the 
definition and overview of the research. The third section describes the contributions to 
the body of knowledge. Experimentation, evaluation and limitations will be explained 
in section 5 then followed by the suggestion of future work and research. The chapter 
concludes by outlining key findings of the project and their possible solutions. 
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2 COMPUTER SYSTEMS SECURITY 
2.1 Introduction  
There is no doubt on the benefits computer systems and its applications have brought 
to our life. Large storage space, high processing speed and the pervasive nature of 
computer systems are among the functionalities that have enabled us to do things 
which to us were previously unimaginable. The Internet has completely changed the 
way we communicate. It has made the world in a single village where you can talk and 
chat all over the world cheaply. E-commerce and its applications have introduced new 
business opportunities that have attracted a plethora of computer users.  
 
It is now the reality for all organisations, of any size, that the use of computer systems 
and internet technology is essential to the success of their day-to-day business 
operations. Unfortunately, all these benefits come with security burden. As technology 
advances, it brings with it a number of vulnerabilities. The complex nature of 
applications, the demand for the interoperability of devices and systems, the portable 
nature of devices and the demand for distributed environments have contributed to 
making  digital life miserable and pose significant challenges for organisations.   
 
Individuals and organisations are now enjoying the evil side of technology. Many 
technological and managerial controls have been implemented to fight against these 
evil spirits but still they are suffering. The battle between bad guys and good guys is an 
endless battle. While one end succeeds, the other end changes the tactics. Although the 
investigation of KMS to improve security awareness is the focal point of this 
dissertation, central to achieving this is establishing a clear picture of what exactly is 
involved in computer security, examining the issues from a number of perspectives. 
You can only with the battle when you know how your opponent operates. 
 
This chapter presents a short review of computer security and its evolution to become a 
mainstream topic of importance to all organisations. The variety and complexity of 
issues which fall under the umbrella of computer security are discussed and the 
challenges they present to organisations are assessed from an organisational 
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perspective. The chapter concludes by identifying the security issues which are 
recognised in the literature as those of most importance to modern organisations. 
2.2 Computer  systems background  
In their very beginning, computers where meant to handle well-structured jobs such as 
scientific or transaction calculations that were difficult for human beings (S. Gupta & 
Mccabe 1987). These computers were built by vacuum tubes; they were very huge in 
size and their speeds were relatively slow. Those were the days when multitasking was 
merely a nightmare and the only interactions with computers were through punched 
cards (Lubbes 1993). During those days, computer security was not a headache; the 
main concern was physical security of computer room. Table 1 presents the summary 
for computer systems evolution.  
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decision 
support systems 




Table 1: Five Generations of Computers 
(Adapted from (A. Gupta & Toong 1984)) 
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As shown in table 1, the second generation of computer systems was built on 
transistors. However, this turned out to be unsuccessful because the acquisition cost 
was relatively high. This led to the emergence of new breed of computer systems. In 
1960s, the third computer generation was introduced. Computers in this generation 
were built with small scale integrated circuits where one “IC” replaced several 
transistors (Tanenbaum 2008, p.13). This was relatively cheap and attracted more 
people into the world of digital life. Despite of its acquisition cost, computers in this 
generation came along with a lot of magic. Multiprogramming, spooling and 
multitasking are among these wonders which provide a comfortable room for 
networking.  
 
Unfortunately, technology is not stagnant. The more wonders it brings, the more 
insecure we are. In early 1970s, when microprocessors were introduced, things started 
to slip.  The ability to compress multiple functions into a single chip enabled personal 
computers to be built at lower costs that were affordable to almost everyone (A. Gupta 
& Toong 1984). Besides attracting many users, it also introduced another layer of 
security threats; device malfunctioning. This was the era of fault-tolerance where 
system availability was measured based on the cost of the system and its functional 
criticality (Siewiorek & Swarz 1998, p.4).  . 
 
Moreover, as the main memory and processor speed increased, the demand for more 
functionality also increased (S. Gupta & Mccabe 1987). This resulted to more complex 
application programs with thousands of line of codes. Unfortunately, as applications 
grow in line of codes, chances of having software bugs also increases (Tanenbaum 
2008, p.11). It is through the exploitation of these bugs that attackers are able to launch 
their attacks. In fact, above all these threats, with exception of social engineering, 
software bugs are the catalysts for attackers’ malicious events (McGraw 2004).  
 
As technology advances, computer systems become ever cheaper and hence attract 
more users who mostly are not necessarily highly computer literate. Things became 
even worse in 1990s when internet and its twin-brother (WWW) were introduced 
(Mowery & Simcoe 2002). Together, they brought many benefits that organisations 
and individuals could not resist. The introduction of e-business, social networks and 
online gaming have attracted even more users. With the increase in customers, 
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organisations need to provide their services twenty-four hours. All these had happened 
so fast to make the issue of security an after thought (Straub & Welke 1998, p.3). 
 
Technology is not stagnant, the more wonders it brings, the more insecure we are. 
Computer threats evolve the same way as technology evolves. It is because of this 
technology that our digital life now is miserable. It has engulfed us to the extent we 
can not retreat and yet it has not promised our safety. Therefore, it now is a crucial 
moment when knowing what exactly underlies computer security is essential to 
determine the necessary means of tossing the other side of the coin to ensure improved 
safety. 
2.3 Key  Issues in  Computer  systems security  
There is no doubt about the wonders computer systems have brought to our life. Early 
from its dawn, computer systems enabled us to do scientific calculations that were 
iron-line to human brains. Those were the days where only few people had a direct 
access with it. However, technology is not stagnant. As technology began its pace, the 
cost of building computer systems drastically decreased. This changed the scope of 
computer systems. Much functionality were demanded to suit the flexibility nature of 
business. Unfortunately, technology has equal opportunities to anybody. As it 
advances, it attracted another category of beneficiaries. Therefore, it is now a crucial 
for organisation to turn their head and consider the negative side of computer systems.  
 
Stallings (2006, p.3) defines computer security as security of computer systems against 
any malicious events. These events generalise both human intruders and anything that 
associate with it (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.8). Furthering the scope of computer 
security, Andress (2003, p.5) argues that security is a three parameter process; 
technology, people and process. Technology readiness provides computer security with 
sophisticated control measures against malicious events. The process determines how 
security should be exercised within the organisation while people are the one who 
should practice security principles to ensure computer security. 
  
The discipline of computer security is so wide, it can take years to tackle every niche 
of it. However, to avoid the trivialness side of it and to welcome the clarity side, this 
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section will only tackle computer security in three dimensions as proposed by Bishop 
(2003, p.4). Bishop argues that computer security spans into three concepts; 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, see figure 1. Therefore, this section will 
explore the broadness of these concepts in relation to computer security and their 
effects in organisational context.  
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
(Source: (C. P. Pfleeger & S. L. Pfleeger 2003, p.11)) 
2 .3.1  Confidentiality  
The explanation of this aspect differs depending on the context they arise. Bishop 
(2003, p.4) defines confidentiality as the process of concealing the accessibility of 
information resources from an unauthorised access while on the other hand, network 
gurus define confidentiality as a process of concealing the transmitted data from being  
intercepted by intruders (Stallings 2006, p.18). However, all these definitions have 
common aim of prevention of unauthorised access to information resources.  Due to 
high sensitivity of their information and need of classified information, military 
defence is renowned as the antecedent of this aspect (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.28).   
 
Many researchers argue that the successfulness of organisation relies on how well it 
utilise its intangible resources to create new ideas and innovations (Alavi 1997; Hahn 
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& Subramani 2000; Lang 2001; Stenmark 2002). However, they overlooked a crucial 
bit of protecting these ideas and innovations. For instance, suppose the marketing and 
sales team of Vodafone had managed to harness whatever their staffs has to come up 
with a new strategy of cutting down their call rates to attract more customers however 
security was overlooked and no proper security control measures implemented. Their 
rival O2 came across the ideas and launched the offer before they could. What do you 
think will happen, will Vodafone still execute their strategy as they expected?  
 
This concludes that the issue of confidentiality is not only a military issue. As it is 
badly required by military to protect their missiles’ technology, so are financial and 
other organisations in protecting their intellectual properties (Randeree 2006; Cole et 
al. 2008). This emphasises that for any organisation to be successful it should know 
how to leverage what employees’ have as well as to provide necessary protection to 
their intelligence. Unfortunately, many of mechanisms to ensure confidentiality relies 
on human being who are required to secretly handle their account passwords or an 
encryption key .  
 
Moreover, the issue of confidentiality has gained more popularity in the domain of 
medicine (Siegler 2006). The demand for improving effectiveness and efficiency of 
health care services by providing a lifelong storage, twenty-four hours and public 
access of patients’ records have came along with risks of confidentiality of patients’ 
information (McClelland & Thomas 2002). All these come by introducing 
sophisticated technologies that needs to be operated by professionals who are not 
native of medical domain (Siegler 2006, p.598).   
 
However, this does not mean that other organisations are safe from confidentiality 
issue. Other organisations like financial institutions, education, transportation, and any 
organisations, are the victims of system failures, data and money theft and all sorts of 
evils due to failure of enforcing confidentiality. Military, Telecommunication and 
Medicine organisations have been used in this section to elaborate the danger that 
might occur due to violation of confidentiality. 
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2 .3.2  Integrity  
If we can not guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive information at least we have to 
validate the originality of that information. According to Janczewski and Colarik 
(2005, p.2) data integrity is protecting message from unauthorised modifications. 
Moreover, Caroll (1996, pp.369-374) defines data integrity as assurance of the 
trustworthiness of data. This is very essential attribute when it comes to internet and 
data storage as well. Customers need to be sure of what they send and receive through 
the communication channel while on the other hand financial institutions focus on data 
error cleaning to reduce noisy data.  
 
Moreover, Zhou and Haas (1999) argue that message integrity can be violated by 
“radio propagation impairment” and malicious attacks. However, for the purpose of 
this dissertation, only violations based on malicious attacks will be considered. 
Working with integrity is different from working with confidentiality. In 
confidentiality the data is either compromised or not, but in integrity it involves the 
correctness of the data; from whom the information is from, how well the data was 
handled before reaching destination machine and how is being protected in the current 
machine (Bishop 2003, p.5).  
 
However, it is very difficult to guarantee data trustworthiness with human element 
(Lee et al. 2002). The field of integrity is also very active in database management 
systems (DBMS) and data mining as well. In DBMS, failure to record a correct entry 
can have a big effect to organisation. For instance, if a “Store Keeper” wants to order 
new computers for organisation “A” and instead of writing 50, unconsciously she 
writes 500. This can cause a loss of large amount of money to her organisation. 
Moreover, data error is a hot topic in data mining. Failure of cleansing data in data 
mining can result to instability of predicted models (Maletic & Marcus 2000). All 
these scenarios emphasises the danger human element can violate integrity. 
2 .3.3  Availability  
Availability goes the other way around of confidentiality. Confidentiality focuses on 
limiting data availability while on the other hand, availability strives to make data 
available (C. P. Pfleeger & S. L. Pfleeger 2003, p.12). Therefore, building on that view 
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there must be a balance between these two. However, availability stretches to both the 
system itself and the data in it. On system side, availability means the system is fully 
operational while on the data side, availability means more than just available for use 
(C. P. Pfleeger & S. L. Pfleeger 2003, p.12). It goes beyond to consider the response 
time and fairness between requesters. The former consider the time taken from the 
time the request was made to the time the data was retrieved. The latter considers the 
biasness of resource allocation between requesters.  
 
However, many researchers have defined availability differently. Bishop (2003, p.6) 
defines availability as the ability to request and use the systems and resources as 
desired. Moreover, Janczewski and Colarik (2005, p.2) defines availability as the 
protection of intruders from withholding of information and resources. Regardless to 
the meaning of definitions, they all emphasise on convenient environment with no or 
minimal system downtime.  
2 .3.4  Confidentiality,  Integrity,  Availabili ty 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are core elements of computer security and 
yet human element is the centre of all these. Employees are expected to keep their 
password confidential and yet they may be required to share with colleagues. On the 
other hand network administrators are required to carefully analyse network traffic and 
yet they ignore it. Moreover, clerks are expected to correctly record data entries, but 
yet they either forget or intentionally record them incorrectly. All these intentionally 
and unintentionally decisions that humans makes have huge impact to organisation 
prosperity. 
2.4 Computer  systems threats  
As previously mentioned, technology is the engineer of all these threats. It is 
egocentric to deny the benefit technology has brought us. Unfortunately it is this 
technology that made computer attacks evolved from physical to remote attacks. Now 
we hear many new terms describing different types of attacks that are out there. 
Terminologies like crimeware, malware, driven-by-downloads attacks, man-in-the-
middle and many alike have filled the air of digital world. All these terminologies 
reflect the increase in vulnerabilities and computer threats as well. 
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Figure 2: Trend of internet vulnerabilities 
(Adapted from (Stallings 2006, p.10)) 
 
As it can be shown on figure 2, in 1995 where internet technology was in its 
embryonic stage, the numbers of vulnerabilities were minimal. However, as years are 
piling and demands for more functionalities increases, things are getting even worst. 
As it can be shown from figure 2, number of vulnerabilities increases with the increase 
of years. 
 
However, prior to explanation of computer threats it is worthwhile explaining the 
jargons that are associated with it. These include threats and vulnerabilities. Bishop 
(2003, p.6) defines threat as a possibility for vulnerability exploitation. This implies 
that not necessarily for a threat to occur to be called a threat. On the other side, 
vulnerability can be defined as the existence of security loophole that if exploited can 
lead to security breach (Peltier 2005). For instance, the discovery of a bug in a browser 
which is regarded as vulnerability, in itself is qualified to be a threat even though it has 
not been exploited already. 
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2 .4.1  Motivation  of  Computer  Attackers  
It is trivial knowing the number of computer break-ins without knowing the motivation 
behind them. Therefore it is worthwhile understanding why computer attackers and 
cyber-criminals do what they do. What things that motivates them to be as they are. 
George (2007) proposed three factors that motivate these miscreants to be what they 
are. Everything we are doing, we do for reasons.  
 
In his descriptions, George (2007) explained three reasons; acts of damage, 
propaganda and recruitment and internal communication platform as most reasons to 
why attackers practices evil things.  In acts of damage he explained political and 
financial influences. In propaganda he explained about the art of being recognised and 
lastly the disgruntled employees. For instance, due to employment termination 
employee can leave a backdoor or logic bomb that can cause disaster to the 
organisation (McClure, Scambray & Kurtz 2005, p.14). 
 
In other words, organisations are at high risks. It is this human that organisation trust 
and give them keys in terms of passwords to ensure confidentiality of organisation’s 
intellectual property. It is this human that organisation trust and give them authority to 
control data entry points to ensure the integrity of organisation’s information. It this 
human element that organisation trust and give them privilege to monitor network 
traffic to prevent organisational network from system downtime. Unfortunately, it is 
this human element that organisation can never operate without them. Therefore, it is 
necessary for organisations to come up with strategies that will prevent these 
“humans” from being conned with ice-like motivations to give-up their trust. 
2 .4.2  Categories  of  threats  
Furthering on the discussion of computer threats, Russell and Gangemi (1991, p.14) 
argues that computer threats comes into three categories; natural and physical, 
unintentional and intentional. Natural and physical threats include fire, flood, power 
failures and any disaster mainly for computer hardware and premises. On the other 
hand, unintentional threats consider awareness of perpetrator (Russell & Gangemi 
1991, p.14). If user forgets to shut down the computer system when leaving the office 
or failed to apply software patches due to lack of knowledge is termed as awareness 
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issue. Lastly is the intentional category which is mainly the focus of this section 
because it combines all elements of the latter categories. 
 
Intentional threats include those threats where the perpetrator is being driven by 
motivations. These motivations can either be monetary, revenge or popularity (Gorge 
2007). Russell and Gangemi (1991, p.14) went further and subcategorises intentional 
threat into two categories; inside and outside threats. Inside threats generalise all 
threats that are perpetrated from inside the organisation while outside threats are those 
that originated from outside the organisation. The whole of this section will focus into 
discussing these two subcategories. The discussion will begin with outside threats and 
finalise with inside threats. Though there are exists massive types of these threats, but 
for the purpose of this dissertation only few relating examples will be considered. 
2 .4 .2 .1  Outside  threats  
Financial gain, revenge and/or the sense of being famous are among motivations that 
drive malicious events (Gorge 2007). Outside threats “outsiders” generalise all threats 
that are perpetrated from outside the organisation. There are thousands of these attacks 
from the former virus techniques where they were dependent on physical distribution, 
to the virus of today where they can automatically be perpetrated. However, all these 
attacks will be explained in three categories; technical, non-technical and hybrid. 
 Technical threats 
Technology is evolving at a hitherto unimaginable speed. It has evolved from the ages 
of mainframe, where applications were limited to specific operations, to the era of 
personal computers where there are thousands of applications with different 
functionalities. However, as functionalities increases, complexity also increases so as 
the number of bugs (McGraw 2004). It is these bugs that are nest ground for attackers. 
Meanwhile, technical threats are those threats that perpetrated due to software security 
ramifications (McGraw 2004). Through software bugs “vulnerabilities”, attackers can 
exploit and initiate their attacks. These threats include viruses, worms, Trojan horse, 
denial of service attacks and many alike. 
 
Though one may argue there is no need for employees to be aware on these attacks 
since they are self originated from software, employees’ awareness is still crucial to 
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minimise their successfulness (NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003). Software developers need to 
discuss about how to go about developing secure software, while on the other hand 
end-users need to be reminded to run software patches. 
 Non-technical threats 
Picking a phone and calling a helpdesk to pose as a system administrator who is away 
from the office and desperately ask for a login password pretending to issue a very 
crucial transaction, does not include any element of technicality. While technical 
threats take advantages of software bugs, non-technical threats take advantage of 
human behaviours and their trust (Contos 2007). Non-technical threats are those 
threats that are perpetrated by human.  
 
However, this should not be confused with inside threats. In inside threats, malicious 
corrupted employees initiate attacks while non-technical attacks employees pose as 
vulnerability. These attacks are mainly characterised by social engineering techniques 
where bad guys studies employees’ weaknesses and use those weaknesses to rule them 
to give out their passwords or any valuable information that eventually may cause a 
catastrophic damage to organisation (Fyffe 2008).  
 
As it was explained, all these attacks are directly related to employees within 
organisations. If employees are well informed about all their importance in ensuring 
organisational computer security, and all possible ways of being conned to leak 
organisational intellectual properties, these attacks will at least be minimised. It is 
therefore necessary for organisations to appreciate employees’ contribution in 
computer security and to frequently keep them informed on current computer threats. 
 Hybrid threats 
As technology evolves, security tools and applications are becoming strong in 
protecting against computer threats. On the other side, attackers keep on changing their 
tactics to win the battle. As a result, human are left alone without proper knowledge on 
how to defend themselves against these attacks. Having spotted this loophole, attackers 
have now changed their tactics to integrate weaknesses from both ends. In other words, 
hybrid threats are those threats that combine both software errors and human 
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weaknesses to launch their attacks. These threats include scam emails, spams, phishing 
and many alike. 
 
All these threats have huge negative impacts to the prosperity of organisation. As 
George (2007) ascertained, attackers do what they do because of motivations. These 
motivations can either be destructive, propaganda or revengeful. However, whichever 
the motivation of an attacker is, organisation suffers in one way or the other. Through 
these threats organisation can loose large amount of money, its reputation can be 
ruined through customers’ distrustful toward its operations. Moreover, organisation’s 
performance and its business opportunities are at stake. If a Trojan horse is planted into 
organisation’s server where all sensitive information is stored, by transmitting this 
information to rivalries, the organisation would not be able to perform to its fullest. 
2 .4 .2 .2  Inside  threats  
Financial gain, revenge and/or the sense of being famous are among motivations that 
drive malicious events (Gorge 2007). This raises the question then, who is the 
attacker? By its simplicity, attacker is anybody who is attracted by the said motivations 
to conduct malicious events. Therefore, it is clear from these motivations that anybody 
can be a savage. Building on these explanations, it is therefore crucial to luminance 
employees in organisations. Following these motivations, trusted employees may 
betray their trust and practice malicious events. In fact, an insider threat is the hot topic 
in the security arena. Many researchers have researched about this topic (Schultz 2002; 
Kemp 2005; Contos 2007). While disgruntled and malicious corrupted employees fall 
under inside threats category (Bishop 2005), 
 
Contos (2007) defines insiders as those employees who have administrative privileges 
and can use any system to intentionally violate security policies. Moreover, Schultz 
and Shumway (2002, p.189) defines inside threats as intentional misuse of computer 
systems by users who are authorized to access those systems and networks. Though it 
is not clearly stated from all these definitions, inside attackers extends to include ex-
employees and third parties; consultants, contractors and temporary helpers (Schultz 
2002; Kemp 2005; Contos 2007). Unlike outside attackers, insiders pose a big 
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challenge because they can legitimately pass electronic and physical security controls 
(Contos 2007). 
 
The joint survey “Insider Threat Study” conducted in 2002 by United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), United States Secret Service (USSS) 
National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) reveals that 86% of insiders held 
technical positions. In those cases, 81% of the organisations that were attacked 
experienced a negative financial impact as a result of insider activities. The losses 
ranged from a low of five hundred dollars to a high of “tens of millions of dollars.” 
75% of organisations experienced some impact on their business operations. 28% of 
organisations experienced negative impact to their reputations. The survey included 
forty-nine inside threats cases which were experienced between 1999 and 2002 (US-
CERT 2008). 
 
Authentication is one method of ensuring information confidentiality. Unfortunately, 
password mechanism is the common approach to it. The survey conducted by Stanton 
and colleagues (2005) on users’ behaviour pertaining password management revealed 
that 27.9% of 1167 respondents write down their passwords to help them remember. 
However, this is motivated by the number of different passwords user needs to interact 
with a number of different systems in their daily operations. As usual, technology is 
there to serve human being. The emergent of automated tools such as cookies that keep 
track of users’ password was embraced by users. Unfortunately these tools made 
things even easier for attackers to obtain users passwords (Stanton et al. 2005).  
 
Though many solutions are proposed to deal with inside attackers, employees’ 
awareness in security issues is still crucial (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.13). However, 
it should also be noted that awareness of security policies and computer threats alone is 
not enough to tackle this problem. Security awareness programme(s) should go further 
to address the issues by making employees understand their contributions in the 
organisations and their benefits out of it. Furthermore, management should consider 
employees’ incentives when practicing good security principles.  
 
All these threats have large negative impacts to the prosperity of organisations. As 
George (2007) ascertained, attackers do what they do because of motivations. These 
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motivations can either be destructive, propaganda or revengeful. However, whichever 
the motivation of an attacker is, organisation suffers in one way or the other. Through 
these threats organisation can loose large amount of money, its reputation can be 
ruined by customers’ distrustful toward its operations. Moreover, organisation’s 
performance and its business opportunities are at stake. If a Trojan horse is planted into 
organisation’s server where all sensitive information is stored, by transmitting this 
information to rivalries, the organisation would not be able to perform to its fullest. 
2.5 Computer  systems security  controls  
Attackers are good on what they do because of the incentives they are up to (Gorge 
2007). Following these incentives, anyone can be motivated and act maliciously. 
Those guys from outside are working twenty-four-seven to fulfil their motives while, 
on the other hand, employees are betraying their trust and act maliciously. The danger 
is huge out there. Organisations are not safe from both inside and outside miscreants. It 
is now time for organisations to understand what they worth and initiate necessary 
control measures against these attacks.   
 
Computer systems security has long evolve into a number of phases (Dhillon 1999; 
von Solms 2000; D'Arcy & Hovav 2007). As technology evolves, attackers also 
change their tactics, so as the control measures. From the age of mainframe where 
control measures intended to protect computer premises and resources usage, to the 
client-server era where single access controls were appropriate control measures, up to 
web services arena where there is a need of international standards and highly 
expertise in computer security. Many researchers contributed in describing this 
evolution (Dhillon 1999; von Solms 2000; D'Arcy & Hovav 2007). 
 
Dhillon (1999) describes computer security based on three intervention; technical, 
formal and informal. He explained the reliance of technology like message 
authentication, encryption and digital signature (technical interventions), and 
emphasised on organisation restructuring to accommodate computer security (formal 
interventions). In informal interventions he emphasised on the importance of educating 
users in computer security issues. 
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von Solms (2000) describes computer systems security into series of waves. In the first 
wave he described computer security based on technical controls like user passwords 
and ids. In the second wave he focused on management involvement in computer 
security where he mentioned the establishment of security policies and procedures. In 
the final phase he focused on the need of international security standards and security 
certification, organisational security culture and keeping an eye on control measures. 
 
Moreover, D'Arcy and Hovav (2007) describe computer security with four 
countermeasures; security policies, security awareness programs, computer 
monitoring, and preventive security software. The first and second countermeasures 
emphasises on enforcing security good conducts by defining security requirements in 
terms of users’ responsibilities and procedures, and inform their duties and 
consequences of their ignorance. Computer monitoring provides a close watch of 
users’ behaviours whereas the last countermeasure focuses on protecting against 
unauthorised access.  
 
All the above analysis of computer security share common perceptions. Almost all 
descriptions explicitly, if not implicitly, explain technical, management and 
institutional security control measures. Therefore, in order to be consistent, this section 
will adopt the approach described by von Solms (2000) to describe different computer 
security control measures. This approach was chosen because it reflects the reality of 
implementing security control measures based on organisations’ needs. The summary 
of what constitute in each phase is provided in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Summary of security control waves 
 
To begin with the discussion, this section starts by the discussion of first wave where it 
includes the discussion of all physical and technical security control measures. The 
discussion of the second wave will follow where all managerial participation in 
computer security will be discussed. Finally, the discussion of the third wave where it 
will describe international security concerns and the focus of human factor in security 
controls. In this section each phase will be used as an umbrella to accommodate all 
security control measures that fall under that category.  
2 .5.1  The  Fi rst  Wave  - Technical  
Computer threats are evolving with technology evolution. The more technology 
introduce us new magic, the more attackers are closing the gap toward us. Technology 
in its embryonic stage, computer attacks required physical mechanisms like floppy 
disks for virus distribution or physical tapping of cooperate network. However, things 
are different now. With an openness of internet, attackers are able to launch there 
attacks almost anywhere in the world. Only your IP address is enough to track where 
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you are. Although there are voluminous of control measures to deal with these attacks, 
this section will only explain some of them. 
 
Technology in its dawn, computer security was not a headache. This was the time 
when physical guiding of computer rooms was enough to ensure safety of computer 
system and its resources. In this era, security related roles concentrated on physical 
controls and suitable motivations for computer operators (Janczewski & Colarik 2005, 
pp.6-7). Their main concerns were limited to power fluctuations and natural disasters 
like fire and flood.  This was the time when identification cards, fire alarms, sprinkler 
systems, temperature gauges and surge protectors were enough for computer security 
(Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.14).  
 
Furthermore, to control computer system from unauthorised access, operating systems’ 
facilities like account access controls, user ids and passwords were enough to 
guarantee the security of organisation’s information resources (von Solms 2000). 
However, this unauthorised access meant protecting the system from computer 
resources abuse (Andress 2003, p.1). This was the time when computer memory and 
speed were scarce resources.  
 
As computer memory and speed increased, and after organisations’ realisation of the 
power of information, computer controls shifted to enhance confidentiality and 
integrity of information (von Solms 2000). In their initial forms, these controls focused 
on prevention of information disclosure by limiting illegal copies of information stored 
on magnetic media or hard documents (Janczewski & Colarik 2005, pp.6-7). Things 
changed when information sharing arouse. More technologies such as granular access 
control, single sign-on and encryption were developed to prevent unauthorized access 
and modification (Andress 2003, p.1). 
 
However, with all these control measures the number of computer break-ins kept on 
increasing. The complexity of software applications kept on increasing, so as the 
number of bugs. Moreover, software engineering paradigm did not consider the issue 
of security as their concerns. On the other hand, users who operate computer systems 
and the so called security tools and applications were left unaware of the current 
computer threats and how they attack.  
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2 .5.2  The  Second  Wave  – Management  
As it was mentioned previously, computer security is a three magnitude process. It 
involves technology, people and process (Andress 2003, p.5). Failure of one 
component leads to the failure of the whole process and hence leaves the organisation 
and its sensitive information in a jangle. The first wave of computer control measures, 
organisations strive to acquire the most sophisticated technologies to patch security 
holes. Security controls ranged from physical controls where the focus was on 
protecting computer premises, to the installation of necessary technologies to combat 
with computer attacks.  
 
However, as technology kept on advancing, information became an organisational 
asset hence management involvement in computer security became apparent (von 
Solms 2000). This was the time when organisational security exceeded its boundaries 
by maintaining organisation’s reputation by considering costumers’ trust and 
satisfaction (Herold 2005, pp.7-14). Technical personnel realised the pressure of 
maintaining corporate security and they demanded for power to control corporate 
security. This was when security policies were introduced in organisations to enforce 
employees’ accountability for security related activities (Herold 2005, p.15).  
 
The first initiative to establish security policies was by US Department of Defence 
(DoD) in 1970s where they sponsored a research which focused on developing security 
policy models (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.30). The first form of security policies was 
simple only concentrating on guiding employees from drinking or smoking in 
computer room (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.14). However, as technology evolves new 
policies are emerged to cope with current security issues. Security policies for guiding 
employees from smoking or drinking do not work with today’s technological 
advancement. Internet, World Wide Web and the so called E-commerce demands more 
sophisticated policies on ensuring online trust and internet usage within organisations. 
 
However, all these security policies are not enough to ensure maximum computer 
security within the organisation. The worst part of is the nature of policy 
establishment. Policies are established based on computer threats. Therefore with this 
growing nature of technology, it is apparent that there will be thousands of policies to 
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be followed. Moreover, it is nearly impossible for these policies to luminance every 
aspect of human concerning with computer security. Technology is unpredictable 
parameter therefore organisations should focus more on building their manpower to 
exercise computer security ethics. Management should show their concerns with 
computer security, and the potentiality of its subordinates in ensuring corporate 
computer security.  
2 .5.3  The  Third  Wave  -  Institutionalisation  
As technology advances the world becomes a single village. The issue of computer 
security become a global problem. Physical and technical controls and ordinary 
organisational security policies become out weighted when it comes to digital world. 
This is the era that characterised by computer security standardisation, international 
computer security certifications, security culture and dynamic measure of computer 
security control measures (von Solms 2000). In this wave, computer security control 
measures shifted from organisational interests to governmental and international 
interests. The interest is not how the organisation benefits from computer security, but 
what organisations do to ensure customers’ privacy and state security. 
 
In this wave the focus is the state level of information and computer security 
management and combination of experiences of several big organisations in computer 
security management to form a consensus on common international information and 
computer security standards (von Solms 2000). This can be exemplified by European 
Data Protection Directive that focuses on privacy protection of citizens by insisting 
training to employees about privacy issues. However, this is directive focus only 
within European Union. On the other hand, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act focuses on 
controlling financial activities. 
 
In this wave, management shifted their gears to consider training and education to its 
employees. The locus shifted from just maintaining corporate information to the 
compliance of the growing number of laws and regulations that enforce information 
protection and customers’ privacy (Herold 2005, p.5). Moreover, the international 
image of computer security is reflected with the existence of pool of security 
qualification certificates. Following ISO standards which also emphasises on 
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employees’ training, there are security qualification certificates that focuses on 
equipping information security personnel with appropriate skills to initiate and execute 
training programme in organisations. 
2.6 Conc lusion  
This chapter aimed at investigating current situations on computer threats as associated 
with users and the efforts organisations undertake to control them. In computer 
systems background, a discussion of computer evolution in relation to computer 
security was conducted. In this chapter, it is pointed out that the advancement nature of 
technology has a large impact on computer security by both introducing more bugs 
into applications and attracting more users who are most susceptible to computer 
threats. Moreover, it is this technology that facilitates the advancement of computer 
attacks by offering more convenient ways for attackers to launch their attacks. 
 
Moreover, in this chapter human element has been identified as a central to 
successfulness of computer security and organisation’s prosperity as well. It is human 
element that is responsible to maintain confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
organisation’s information resources. This view directly correlates with the increase 
number of inside threats. Employees are either unintentionally or intentionally ignore 
organisation’s security requirements and hence encourages more security break-ins 
which results to loss of reputation, competitive advantages and money to the 
organisation.  
 
Many computer security control measures have been implemented, from technical 
through managerial to institutional, to combat with computer threats. Unfortunately, 
with all these efforts the number of computer threats keeps on increasing. Although 
among these control measures security user awareness has been identified as the key to 
successful computer security, it either receives little emphasise from management or 
lacks appropriate approaches to attract users’ participation. Therefore, the next chapter 
provides the discussion of security awareness with emphasise on investigating users’ 
involvement in security awareness and the effectiveness of current security awareness 
programmes in educating users. 
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3 SECURITY AWARENESS 
3.1 Introduction  
As it was explained previously, many security mechanisms exist to fight against the 
current computer threats. Although there is recognition that the human factor plays an 
important part of security mechanisms, the role of user awareness receives limited 
attention. Security user awareness programmes focus at informing users on their roles 
and responsibilities and imparting them with appropriate knowledge to fulfil them. 
However this should not be confused to end-users alone. Managers’ and IS specialists’ 
involvement should also be taken into considerations. Currently, there are many types 
of security awareness programmes but they overlook the importance of users’ 
involvement in security awareness material preparation. 
 
Although security awareness is just one component of security learning circle, for the 
purpose of this dissertation it will be discussed in detail with other components being 
presented in less detail.  The main aim of this dissertation is to develop a framework to 
harness the power of KMS to improve security awareness. However, it is worth to 
have a clear understanding of security awareness in an organisational context and 
identify key issues that have been notified in literature as crucial for successful 
implementation of security awareness programme(s).  
 
Due to the influence of security awareness in information systems’ security, much has 
been written emphasising its different aspects. However, in this dissertation, the focus 
will be only be on exploring different perceptions of security awareness programme, 
designing process, current awareness programmes, their success and failure and 
security awareness in developed and developing countries. Though developed and 
developing countries includes many countries, this chapter will only consider Ireland 
and Tanzania as developed and developing countries respectively. This chapter 
concludes by outlining the crucial bits for the success of security awareness 
programme(s). 
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3.2 What  is security  awareness?  
In chapter 2, many security threats and their possible solutions have been discussed. 
The majority, if not all, of these threats are either caused or driven by human element 
from both top managers and operational employees. Software flaws, caused by 
developing team, are very common in this era of project deadlines. They are very 
common gateways for security threats. On the other hand, social engineering 
dominates in ruling employees into opening gates for attackers. It is therefore very 
crucial for organisations to take into account users’ education in security relevant 
issues.  
 
As it was explained previously, security is a three magnitude process. It involves 
technology, people and process. This implies failure to one component results to the 
failure of the whole process (Andress 2003, p.5). There is no doubt on the maturity of 
technological security controls. The existence of anti-virus, anti-spam, firewalls, 
network sniffers and many alike all, shows the extent to which technology has 
dominated computer security. However, user’ education on security relevant issues 
receives a minimum attention. As a result many security awareness programmes fails. 
This section explores what exactly a security awareness programme is, the roles that 
must be involved and its differences from training and education.  
3.2 .1  Securi ty awareness  -  Defined  
Prior to delving into discussing security awareness programme, it is worthwhile 
explaining the differences between security policies, security awareness and security 
awareness programme. Russell and Gangemi (1991, p.30) defines security policy as a 
tool for enforcing computer security by declaring rules, standards and regulations on 
how computer and information assets should be managed within an organisation. On 
the other hand, Desman (2002, pp.3-10) defines security awareness as employees’ 
understanding on security control measures and their consequences. The former 
defines security requirements while the latter determines users’ understanding. 
Furthermore, NIST-SP 800 – 50 (2003) defines security awareness programme as the 
vehicle for disseminating information that users need in order to do their jobs. It is then 
clear from the definition that the latter communicates security requirements. 
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However, there is still a conflict on what exactly is security awareness programme. As 
NIST-SP 800 – 50 (2003) defines, security awareness programme as a vehicle for 
disseminating information that users, including managers, need in order to do their 
jobs. On the other side, Nosworthy (2000) defines security awareness programme as a 
tool to impart users with appropriate knowledge to perform their duties. The former 
definition emphasises on informing users about what they should do to ensure security 
of corporate information assets and the consequences of their security related 
decisions. Contrary, the latter definition emphasises on imparting users with 
appropriate knowledge to perform security related responsibilities. 
  
The former definition lacks the reflection that it should also be a tool to impart users 
with appropriate knowledge to perform their duties (Nosworthy 2000). How can a user 
know how to deal with new phishing techniques without being imparted with 
appropriate knowledge? The awareness of roles and responsibilities must go hand-in-
hand with appropriate knowledge so as to enable users to participate in improving 
organisational security. The latter definition can also be backed-up by the work of 
D’Arcy and Hovav (2007) where they defines security awareness programme as the 
improvement of users’ understanding on their responsibilities on ensuring security of 
organisational knowledge and information resources, and the consequence of ignoring 
or abusing these resources by imparting them with appropriate skills to fulfil their 
responsibilities.  
 
Therefore, throughout this dissertation, security awareness programme will be 
regarded as a twofold role. The first role “awareness” as a means of disseminating 
information about users’ responsibilities, working standards and procedures (Desman 
2002, pp.3-10) and the second role “simple training” as disseminating security 
relevant material explaining current issues of computer threats so as to combat users 
with appropriate knowledge to fight against these threats (D'Arcy & Hovav 2007). 
However, it is worthwhile explaining what, who and how parts of security awareness 
programme. The “what” part explains what should be disseminating, “who” explains 
the target audience and “how” explains the procedures for accomplishing the “what”.  
 
Consider this scenario. Security personnel of organisation “A” drew a policy to 
strengthen employees’ passwords. The policy only states the minimum requirement for 
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password length as 14 characters long. What do you think will happen to employees? 
Will they ignore the policy for the fear that the password will be too long? The answer 
is obvious no. Users tend to go for a cheaper solution, they will comply with the policy 
by creating a 14 long password but only with letters, which is easy to be hacked. 
Therefore, without imparting users with appropriate knowledge on how to create 
strong passwords they can still adhere with the policy but in their simplest way which 
creates a burden to computer security. This concludes that the “what” and “how” of 
security awareness programme should go hand-to-hand. 
 
Who are target audience? This question is the same as whose are security policies for? 
As it was defined previously, security policy is a tool for enforcing computer security 
by declaring rules, standards and regulations on how computer and information assets 
should be managed within an organisation (Russell & Gangemi 1991, p.30). This 
implies that the issue of computer security is an organisational issue, therefore there is 
no exceptional. Since security awareness programme is a tool for selling security 
policies and relevant security issues organisational wide therefore all levels of 
organisational management must be included (NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003).  
3.2 .2  Relationship  between  securi ty awareness ,  training  and  education  
Security awareness is just one component of organisational security learning process 
(NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003; Microsoft 2006). The cycle, as described in later sections, 
consists of three components; awareness, training and education. However, there is 
confusion on what constitutes awareness, training and education. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to bring their differences in this section so as to have a clear picture of 
their meaning and purpose.  
 
As it was previously defined, security awareness is the understanding of security 
controls and their effects on organisational IS security (Desman 2002, pp.3-10). 
Moreover, D’Arcy and Hovac (2007) and Microsoft (2006) explain the purpose of 
security awareness as to change users’ behaviour by combating them with appropriate 
security knowledge. On the other hand, training as Microsoft (2006) and NIST-SP 50 
(2006) explains, its main purpose is to impart users with new computer security skills. 
However, it should be noted that the training that is being considered here is absolutely 
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different with the “simple training” as mentioned previously. This one is more formal 
while the former is highly volatile, changes with the daily needs of security 
requirements.  
 
In short, awareness focus on changing employees’ behaviour on specific security 
issues while training focuses on giving new skills to perform a specific function 
(NIST-SP 800 - 50, 2003). Awareness targets everyone in the organisation while 
training only focuses on group of people especially technical staff. Education, on the 
other hand, focuses on creating new knowledge and skills about computer security in a 
broader view by considering other fields like psychology, philosophy and many others 
(Buckley & Caple 2007, p.6).  This level is mainly for security experts who wish to 
expand their security knowledge and relate with other disciplines. More distinctions of 
these three components can be obtained in table 2. 
 
 AWARENESS TRAINING EDUCATION 
Attribute “What” “How”  “Why” 

































Impact timeframe Short-term Intermediate Long-term 
 
Table 2: Awareness, Training and Education - Comparative Framework 
 (Source: NIST-SP 800-16 1998) 
3.3 Security  awareness  building  process  
As was mentioned previously, security awareness programme is the focal point for 
practicing good security principles. If it is well executed, security awareness alone is 
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enough to recover organisation from the hands of attackers (NIST-SP 800 - 50 2003). 
It plays a very difficult role of transforming human behaviours into embracing security 
principles. Therefore, understanding its building blocks is a one step for the 
development of an effective framework to support security awareness which is an aim 
of the project in this dissertation. 
 
Much has been written about the development of security awareness. However only 
the approach proposed by Desman (2002) will be considered in this dissertation. This 
approach was preferred because it is a generic approach; there is no an element of 
biasness due to organisation or country. Desman (2002) describes the process of 
building information security awareness programme(s) as being divided into four 
phases: getting started, establishing baseline, communication and evaluation. In this 
dissertation, the approach is termed as generic approach. However, it should also be 
noted that this name is only for the purpose of this dissertation and not otherwise. 
3.3.1  Get ting  started  
Desman (2002), argues that understanding organisational culture is the key to the 
successful of security awareness programme(s). He commented that by doing so it will 
help in understanding management team, the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the organisation 
and the current workable communication channels in the organisation. Moreover, he 
also suggested that one must ferret for available resources that are useful for a 
successful accomplishment of the programme. These resources includes any control 
measure documentation and any communication channels that are available. 
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Figure 4:  The process for building security awareness programme 
 
3.3.2  Establishing  a  Baseline  
“Building on giant’s shoulders.” is a common axiom that we use. After rummaging for 
existing resources to use, understanding organisation’s key personnel and 
understanding its culture, now it is time to sit down and decide what is to be excluded 
or included in awareness programme and with what extent of amendments. Many of 
obtained control measures might be outdated. Therefore, one need to evaluate the 
necessity of these control measures by reflecting the current situation and decide to 
whether replace them or make them endeavours prior to documentation (Desman 
2002).  
 
Desman also emphasised on the involvement of users who in one way or the other 
participated in the creation of control measures at hand, and also the necessity of 
wining users’ commitments. However, his main concerns were focusing on “big guys” 
who set control measures. The question is what about those people who have not 
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participated in creation but yet they are affected with these control measures? This is in 
fact a very crucial point to miss. Users, at all level, should be consulted for their 
contribution on what seems for them to be necessary for the assurance of corporate 
computer security.   
3.3.3  Communication  
After all necessary procedures to create security awareness materials and that the 
document is already set, what follows then is to get the prepared materials reach all 
people in the organisation. Desman suggests a number of methods to fulfil this task 
including video taping, PC programs, email and web pages and finally paper-and-ink 
approach. In PC programs he explained about moderated screen show with facilitator 
presenting the document and its contents, self-paced moderated screen show and on 
terminal video show. In the latter method he suggested on screen pop up of the show. 
This is when a user login to his/her accounts and receives an option to watch the show 
or ignore it. 
 
In fact the approach of making users watch the scene about security concerns 
whenever they login is an effective approach because it gives them everyday updates 
on security status. Therefore, if there is a new security break-in, this approach is useful 
to deliver the information to users in a real time. One major problem which Desman 
notifies is the awareness of employees who are in holiday. However, this approach is 
even useful when they come back or even when new employees join the organisation. 
Though this may sound to be much involving in respect to time required to sit down 
and watch the movie, a little adjustment of the contents might turn the coin “face-up”  
3.3.4  Eva luation  
All the way from rummaging for existing control measures and communications 
media, amendments and replacements of security controls up to letting the word out, 
letting users to know what has been done, it is a long journey to be left out without 
monitoring its progress. Desman encourages monitoring and evaluation of the program 
so as to evaluate its progress, or otherwise. The aim of the program is to educate users 
on their roles in computer security and the consequences of their ignorance toward 
computer security.  
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Desman (2002) proposes two approaches for monitoring and evaluating security 
awareness programme; number of break-ins and audit reports. Number of break-ins 
focus on pre and post evaluation of computer threats. This type of evaluation can take 
any form; interview or questionnaire. The common questions are like, did the number 
of break-ins increased since the introduction of awareness program? If yes, then what 
could be wrong; the materials covered are irrelevant or they have not reached users at 
large? Moreover, useful information can be obtained from audit trails. The number of 
password failure attempts, attempts to delete system files and may alike. Whatever 
findings from the evaluation, could be very useful information to act as an input for the 
next security awareness materials 
 
This approach is useful because it considers almost every angle of successful building 
of security awareness programme. As it was mentioned in getting started, emphasise 
should be put on understanding organisational culture. Culture is a strong element for 
major changes, so by taking it into account, it means that security awareness 
programme is in the right track for its successful implementation. Moreover, it is also 
important to consider people who participated in the development of previous control 
measures since they may provide some useful information for the successfully 
accomplishment of the programme.  
 
Moreover, a crucial bit of successful security awareness programme is the means of 
communication to deliver what has been prepared to users. Security policies and 
relevant materials should reach employees within organisation at large. Therefore it is 
necessary to opt for communication channel that is acceptable by the people who use 
it. Failure to do so may result to ignorance and hence failure of the programme. 
Finally, there must be some sort of evaluation of the programme. Despite the cost 
spent during programme development, awareness programme aim at reducing the 
number of break-ins by equipping employees with appropriate knowledge. Therefore, 
it is plausible to evaluate its successfulness or otherwise. 
 
However, the question then arouse, is this security awareness programme that we are 
talking about tackling the current state of computer threats where threats evolve at an 
alarming speed or for a long-term plan? If it is for daily, more dynamic environment 
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then this approach is obsolete, unless stated clear that all these steps are for building 
permanent long-term security awareness programme that will be evolving with the 
change in environment.  
3.4 Current security  awareness approaches  
The journey to implement a successful security awareness programme is a long 
journey. Understanding the “what”, “who” and “how” part of it, is just one step for its 
implementation. As it was previously mentioned, much must be covered prior to actual 
implementation of security awareness programme. Desman (2002), describes the 
implementation process with four phases of which each has several subsection that 
explains mosaic of factors to be covered. Since designing a framework for security 
awareness is the aim of this dissertation, it is worthwhile to explore how the olds have 
played the game so that we can snatch some tips out of them.  
 
This section will explore different approaches of security awareness programme by 
examining the applicability of the above defined implementation phases. Though there 
are mosaic of security awareness approaches, this section will only focus on five 
categories that are mostly deployed in industry; incorporating in employment 
agreement, face-to-face, awareness tools, awareness games and web-based. The 
section will finalise by identifying common weaknesses as spotted in these approaches. 
To begin with, the discussion of incorporating security awareness in employment 
agreement will be provided then followed by the discussion of face-to-face approach. 
Thereafter the discussion of awareness tools and games will be provided and finalise 
with the discussion of web-based approaches. 
3.4.1  Securi ty awareness  in  employment  agreements  
Security awareness programme can take many forms.  It can be delivered as a game 
based, face-to-face, awareness tools, web-based. Herold (2005, p.40) proposes an 
approach of incorporating computer security requirements into job descriptions, 
employment agreements and awareness acknowledgements. It is Herold’s idea that by 
incorporating security awareness in employees’ recruitment processes it increases the 
accessibility of security awareness materials since each employee follows the same 
channel of recruitment. 
   40
However, this approach is more static and focuses much on disseminating of security 
policies. The world of digital threats is moving fast. If we need to be safe, then we 
need a more dynamic and real time security awareness approaches. It is insufficient for 
users to just be aware of their responsibilities and the impacts of their decisions. What 
is sufficient is to induce security mindset by making computer security as our daily 
conversations.  
3.4.2  Face-to-face  security awareness  programme  
There are many approaches of face-to-face security awareness programmes (Schifreen 
2006). These approaches range from personal-based to group-based security awareness 
programmes. Personal-based approaches are when a trainer focuses only with an 
individual employee, while group based is when the trainer focuses on a number of 
users. Schifreen (2006, p.56) and Herold (2006, p.225) argues that in-personal 
awareness training is appropriate approach because it reduces interactions between 
audiences and hence increases their attention.  
 
However, the applicability of what has been presented during the awareness session 
depends on the availability of summary material of what has been discussed 
(Nosworthy 2000). They need a good reference material to refer what has been 
discussed. If reference material has been prepared such that it can be used on a daily 
basis then employees would be encouraged even more to use what they have learned 
(Nosworthy 2000). Moreover, the effectiveness of this approach relies on the 
instructor. Most organisations take expert from the domain to conduct a presentation. 
However, being expert not necessarily good presenter (Herold 2005, p.56).   
3.4.3  Securi ty awareness  tools  
As an effort to overcome computer threats based on software vulnerabilities, 
Sankarpandian and colleagues (2008) developed a tool that triggers users’ awareness 
about un-patched software in their system by painting graffiti image on users’ desktop, 
see figure 5. TALC which stands for Threat Awareness, Learning, and Control, 
constantly searches for any installed software in users’ machine then compare the 
results with predefined list of software with available patches from NIST National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) (Sankarpandian, Little & Edwards 2008).  
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Figure 5: Screenshot of TALC Anti-Phishing Tool 
(Source: (http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ )) 
 
If it finds a new patch, it verifies if it has already been applied in corresponding 
software that is currently installed in user’s machine. If it has not been applied, the tool 
draws a graffiti image to notify user about a threat, see figure 5. When user’s cursor 
hover over graffiti area, the tool displays the name of that software and the type of 
threat it might cause. This is done by consulting NVD at connection time to retrieve 
patch information. Threat severity is indicated the size of graffiti image; the larger the 
image the higher the severity. 
 
Although TALC was developed to specifically help home users against computer 
threats based on software vulnerabilities, but it can also effectively work in 
organisation environment where there is no centralised patching system like Marimba 
Patch Management (http://www.bmc.com). However, to effectively handle cross-cut 
computer threats, the tool need to be upgraded to accommodate other threats like 
phishing, social engineering, spam emails, password management any many alike.  
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3.4.4  Securi ty awareness  games  
Participatory approach is among new teaching technique that is being practiced in 
academic institutions. It is a very effective method because it draws learner’s attention 
throughout the session. Since it’s a teaching approach, there is no exemption for its 
applicability into imparting users with appropriate knowledge to deal with different 
computer threats. In this approach users participate into identifying attackers’ 
malicious events by playing game.  
 
After realising the power of games into delivering knowledge, Sheng and colleagues 
(2007), designed an anti-phishing game that focuses on imparting users with 
knowledge to detect malicious websites, see figure 6. They obtained a list of phishing 
URLs and categorised into three categories where training messages were created for 
each category. These messages were then embedded in the game as help and feedback 




Figure 6: Screenshot of Anti- Phishing Phil Game 
(Source: (http://www.cmu.edu/ )) 
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However, the approached is too narrow focusing only on Web sites’ URLs. Suppose, 
in real world, user failed to identify the phishing URL, what should other tips user go 
for? This approach only equips users with phishing websites identification and ignored 
other side of the coin. Moreover, the approach is too rigid; too stiff to include other 
computer threats. The approach need to be very flexible to accommodate any computer 
threat at hand (Sankarpandian, Little & Edwards 2008). 
3.4.5  Web-based  approaches  
Face-to-face security awareness approach is inappropriate when the organisation is of 
mega size. To conduct security awareness programme in an environment like this it 
involves both time and money. Therefore, in the environment like this a web-based 
approach can be deployed. The common methodologies in web-based approach are 
security awareness via e-mail and organisational websites. E-mail approach is when 
security personnel posts security related updates to employees through organisational 
or personal email accounts. On the other hand, website is also being used to post 
security related issues.  
 
However, both these approaches have limitations; they only provide a one way 
communications. Though web technology offers much functionality that can 
effectively facilitate security awareness, majority of current web-based awareness 
programmes ignores these functionalities. 
 
Incorporation of security awareness in employment agreements, face-to-face, security 
awareness tools and games, and web-based approaches, all these have limitations on 
effectively communicating security related issues to employees.  Their rigidity nature 
and poor accessibility of employees both reflects their ignorance of security awareness 
building process. Having security awareness programme in place without a proper 
employees’ change management could lead to ignorance of the programme and hence 
failure of security awareness programme. Therefore, to be successful, we need to 
involve employees from initial stages of building process so as to build collaborative 
nature between security personnel and end-users.  
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3.5 Security  awareness  in  Ire land  
“Minister launches internet security awareness campaign” the opening headline of the 
Ireland’s national news independent website, http://www.independent.ie, on February 
11, 2008. It is not the intent of this section to relay news about security awareness, but 
the headline reflects the efforts of which the government of Ireland has taken into 
fighting against computer threats. Although there is no scholarly literature that have 
specifically discussed about security awareness in Ireland, but with this piece of 
information, it is clearly that the issue of computer security has flooded from 
organisations to the public concerns. 
 
Although the aim of this dissertation is to develop a framework to leverage KMS to 
improve security awareness, it is crucial to understand how different countries perceive 
on security awareness. The intent is to develop an open framework that can be applied 
elsewhere in the world; therefore it is worthwhile investigating how different countries 
perceive the issues of security awareness. Ireland was chosen because it was within the 
reach of the author and it also represents developed countries.  
 
Irish government has initiated many campaigns to increase public awareness on 
computer security matters. These campaigns involve different categories of audiences 
including children who are tomorrow’s generation. However, due to lack of source of 
information, this section will only concentrate on web-based security awareness 
approaches specifically to websites and blogs.   
3.5.1  National  campaign  on  securi ty awareness   
Understanding the benefits of computer systems and its applications, and the danger 
that exists on internet services, the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
resources launched an official website as a central for National Awareness campaign 
on Computer security (http://www.ncte.ie). http://www.ncte.ie is an open website 
which aims at providing free tips on computer security to different users. Among the 
users are business, citizens, legal and kids.  
 
This is powerful strategy to motivate both individual and organisations to leverage 
computer security issues in their daily operations. However, the campaign overlooked 
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the involvement of computer and security experts. It overlooked the fact that even 
security experts need to be considered in the periodic education on security matters. 
The website focuses mainly with end-users from different sectors.  
3.5.2  National  Centre  for  Technology in  Education  
The National Centre for Technology in Education (NCTE) is an Irish Government 
agency established to provide advice, support and information on the use of 
information and communications technology (ICT) in education. Following the same 
strategy of raising security awareness within Irish community, NCTE had gone further 
by providing security awareness to its audience under an open website webwise 
(http://www.webwise.ie). This website provides security awareness on different topics 
in computer security. 
 
The website provides awareness into three categories of audiences; children, teens and 
adults. One of the strongest features of http://www.webwise.ie is the ability to deliver 
the message based on the category of audiences. For instance, for kids it uses cartoons 
to elaborate security relevant issues.  Moreover, to delivery teens’ security matters, 
http://www.webwise.ie connects to another open website watchyourspace.ie where 
teens can obtain security issues based on the scenario that suits them 
(http://www.watchyourspace.ie). http://www.webwise.ie also provides video clips and 
“how to” link which elaborates security issues.  
3.5.3  Internet  Advisory Board   
The Internet Advisory Board (IAB) is an Irish body which is responsible on assisting 
and supporting the Irish Internet Service Provider (ISPAI) industry to deliver an 
effective self-regulatory environment for internet content (http://www.iab.ie/). Apart 
from its core duties, IAB also promote awareness of internet safety, particularly with 
regard to children.  
 
It provides guiding information to parents on different techno-social aspects 
concerning their kids. Although, in one side, it is a weakness to only concentrate to 
parents and ignores other categories of users, but in the long run its results could be 
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tremendously. This is because good ethics that are being taught to kids grows with 
them and these kids, in some days, may turn to be good computer security generation.  
 
Ireland is far ahead in security awareness campaign. Government has initiated many 
security awareness initiatives which if they will be maintained and periodically 
improved, Ireland will be the leading territory in Europe in computer security ethics. 
Irish government has shown a good example that can be adopted with other countries. 
Its strategy to educate children in a secure way of using internet and computer systems 
in general, it is a strongest strategy that prepares the next generation to be security 
savvy. It makes children to grow with security mindsets and eventually computer 
security will be adopted in society. 
3.6 Security  awareness  in  Tanzania  
“Currently very few educational institutions have computer laboratories…” and 
“Tanzania needs to create and sustain a secure cyber-law environment...” are the two 
statements that are enough to reflect the perception of security awareness in Tanzania 
(http://www.tanzania.go.tz). Tanzania, like majority of African countries, it is very far 
behind technology, so as computer security. Tanzania was chosen in this dissertation 
because it was within the reach of the author and it also represents developing 
countries.  
 
The evidence shows developing countries are far behind computer security (Cole et al. 
2008). There is no a central body for establishing legal actions on both computer abuse 
and Cybercrime. Currently organisations rely on their security policies as the means of 
protecting their information resources (Bugada 2005). On the other hand individuals 
with internet access at their homeplace relies on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
provide them with some sort of security, only with the exceptional of few home users 
with antivirus applications. 
 
Therefore much effort is required in organisations that are in developing countries. 
Executives need to be educated on the danger of corporate information assets so as 
they can be willing to fund security control measures and also motivate its employees’ 
participation in security issues. However, though this can be seen as a big challenge in 
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computer security context, still it can be advantageous to researchers to develop a 
model that can be used by developing countries when deploying new technology. 
3.7 Failure  of current security  awareness-findings  
Based on the conducted intensive literature review on both computer security and 
security awareness, it is clear that the successfulness of security awareness 
programmes goes with four essential parameters; programme material, mode of 
delivery, security culture and organisation culture. Failure to comply with these 
parameters leads to failure in successful execution of security awareness programme.  
 
The former parameter concentrates on the content that needs to be delivered to the 
targeted users, while mode of delivery focuses on the means of disseminating security 
awareness material. Security culture focuses on motivations and initiatives toward 
computer security, while organisational culture focuses on the “don’ts” and “do’s” of 
the organisation. Though there are many scenarios to elaborate these parameters, this 
section will only concentrates on major ones. 
3.7.1  Material  delivered  to  audiences  
It is boring when attending a chemical engineering presentation of a professor who 
frequently uses chemical terminologies while you are not from that domain. However, 
it is enjoyable listening to Knowledge Management module because you are familiar 
with the terminologies. Unfortunately, the same case happens in security awareness 
programmes. Many organisations overlook the need assessment of security awareness 
materials and instead they buy on shelves material and without even customising to 
meet the nature of organisation’s problem (Herold 2005, p.56). This not only makes 
security awareness session boring but also ruined organisational computer security.  
3.7.2  Mode  of  materia l  del ivery 
Mode of delivery is another crucial parameter. This concentrates on how security 
policies and security relevant materials are being conveyed to employees. Security 
relevant material should be channelled through the media that is accepted by both ends 
of organisational chart; from top management to operational personnel (Desman 2002, 
pp.19-26). However, this is an organisational culture issue; what are the doable and 
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undoable.  Mode of security policy and awareness material delivery must be effective 
enough to both gain high accessibility to organisation as a whole and to be in real time.  
3.7.3  Organisational  security culture  
Current security initiatives and users’ motivations have impact to the successful 
embracement of security awareness programme within an organisation (Chia, Maynard 
& Ruighaver 2002; Herold 2005, p.35). Many researchers have talked about 
organisational security culture but to author’s knowledge none have tried to define 
what it is (Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver 2002). Therefore, for the purpose of this 
dissertation, organisational security culture can be defined as an organisational 
subculture that focuses specifically with security relevance initiatives and motivations. 
This is mainly under the Computer Systems and Information Security department.  
However, this must correlates with the nature organisational culture.  
 
There is no direct tangible benefit of security to users (Bishop 2005, p.16). If there is 
nothing in return, security will turn to be an option to users. However, though there 
might be security policies to bind users to do and not to things, users tend to ignore 
these policies. For instance, though many organisations have “do not share your 
password” policies, survey revealed 23% of 1167 respondents share their passwords 
with their colleagues within and outside their working places (Stanton et al. 2005). 
These passwords may result to financial and/or information theft, loss of business and 
many others. Therefore, it is necessary for Computer Systems and Information 
Security department to initiate motivation schemes to appreciate users’ contributions to 
computer security (Herold 2005, p.35). Users tend to behave positively when they 
know the return of their participation.  
 
“Engagement communicates management’s respect for individuals and their ideas.” 
(Kim & Mauborgne 2003) 
 
In their three principles of “fair process”, Kim and Mauborgne (2003) insist on 
employees’ involvement in making decisions that directly affect them. However, this 
is opposite in security paradigm. Many organisations ignore users when implementing 
security policies.  
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3.7.4  Organisational  culture  
Central to successful of security awareness programme is the understanding of 
organisational culture (Chia, Maynard & Ruighaver 2002; Desman 2002; Herold 
2005). According to Herold (2005, pp.35-36) many employees fail to comply with 
security policies because of their task deadlines and/or obeying their managers who tell 
them to ignore security measures for the purpose of completing a specific task. 
Following the former reason, management should understand that security comes with 
baggage and hence they should loosen their controls. The need for periodic updating 
anti-virus, performing patching and carefully analysing the legitimate of emails and 
websites all these add responsibilities to employees.  
 
Additionally, and which is more obviously, organisation’s support is fundamental 
factor to all above parameters (Herold 2005, p.35). Enough funds must be allocated to 
put them into operation. However, it is different when it comes to the real life.  
According to the survey conducted by D’Arcy and Hovac (2007), security awareness 
programmes had the lowest score. This suggests that although organisations invest 
resources in developing security policies, they don’t devote extensive resources toward 
educating users on the importance of compliance (D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
Management, they see employees’ education on security issues as a waste of money. 
They do not see a tangible benefit out of educating their employees on security issues. 
3.8 Conc lusion  
This chapter aimed at investigating users’ involvement in security awareness and the 
effectiveness of current security awareness programmes in educating users. In the 
second section, the definition of security awareness and the relationship between 
security awareness, training and education was discussed where it was pointed out that 
security awareness is a central to the successfulness of computer security and 
organisation’s prosperity as well. The framework on how to build security awareness 
programme was described in section three where understanding of organisational 
culture has been identified as the key to successful building security awareness 
programme. 
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In section four, the discussion of current security awareness approaches was presented. 
Among these approaches are the integration of security awareness materials in 
employment agreements, face-to-face, games and tools, and web-based. In this 
discussion users’ involvement has been identified as very poor as a result many 
approaches turn to be rigid focusing only with a subset of users and narrow computer 
security threats. The discussion of computer security in developing and developed 
countries was conducted in section five where it has been discovered that most of 
developed countries are far behind in computer security. 
 
In this chapter, poor security awareness material preparations and deliverance, and 
ignorance in organisational culture and security culture has been identified as the key 
factors for the failure of current security awareness programmes. It has been 
discovered that many organisations buy on shelf security awareness materials without 
performing need assessment. Moreover, the gap between security personnel and users 
has also been identified as the driving force for failure of inconsideration of these 
factors. Therefore, to resolve this, the next chapter provides the discussion of KMS 
with emphasise on investigating key processes of knowledge management and 
appropriate features of KMS that will be useful in improving security awareness. 
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4 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction  
Long before the birth of Knowledge Management, information was the most valuable 
asset for the success of an organisation. Organisations were striving for efficient and 
effective use of their information to gain competitive advantage. This was the era of 
Management Information Systems (MIS). The central processing of information and 
real time decisions were pertinent attributes of MIS. In contrast, things turned head-tail 
when the concept of knowledge management emerged. The shift for competitive 
advantage was toward how’s rather than what’s.  Organisations started to realise the 
benefit of intangible assets “Knowledge” over tangible assets “information”. 
 
This was the transition period. Organisations were struggling to shift from production-
based to knowledge-based economy (Kim & Mauborgne 2003). Knowledge economy 
is a type of economy where employees’ ideas and innovations are the catalysts for 
organisational competitive gain. In this era, employees’ knowledge became the most 
valuable asset. Much was invested to attract employees to offer what they have, and 
encourage the coordination among themselves. Organisations started to look again at 
their business; barriers between departments begun to be removed, new roles were 
established, organisations’ rules and procedures were distorted or even new ones were 
created, and new learning culture was introduced. However, to embrace all these new 
type of support from technology and in particular computing was required. 
  
This is when the other side of the coin appeared. The need for collaboration facilities, 
wider range of accessibility and ability to store and maintain unstructured information 
became the crucial attributes for new computer systems. This was the start of the era of 
Knowledge Management Systems (KMS). KMS have become renowned for their 
contributions in assisting employees to improve organisation’s performance so as 
competitive advantages. Implementation of K’Netix in big organisation like Buckman 
Laboratory is the implication of the benefits of KMS (Rumizen 1998; Bernard 2006). 
On the other hand, computer security has been recognised into ensuring the privacy of 
organisational knowledge (Randeree 2006). Therefore, since KMS have proven to be 
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successful in organisations’ performance and computer security has been recognised in 
ensuring organisational knowledge, then why not channel these two paradigms into 
improving computer security awareness as well?  
 
This chapter will investigate features of KMS and prerequisites for their 
implementations in the context of computer security. To accomplish this, an extensive 
literature will be covered to analyse Knowledge Management and its processes, 
difficulties among these processes, available solutions to these problems and the role 
technology plays. This chapter will conclude by highlighting useful features of KMS 
in improving security awareness and its prerequisite for implementing it.  
4.2 Knowledge Management 
There is no doubt about the successfulness of KMS in improving organisational 
performance. The antecedent behind this is the growing nature of technology 
(Marwick 2001). The growing pool of Web 2.0 applications such as Wiki and Blogs 
introduces more functionality that facilitates knowledge sharing in an enterprise wide. 
O’Leary (2008) has discussed a lot about how Wiki can be a useful tool in facilitating 
knowledge sharing within organisations. The existence of ICN ShareNet, a global 
intranet of Siemens and Connect tool of BP are such examples of KMS that facilitates 
collaborative events (Andriessen & Huis in 't Veld 2001).  
 
However, before the implementation of any KMS it is important to clearly understand 
the key concepts of knowledge management, the activities of knowledge management 
and how KMS facilitates these activities. Understanding Knowledge Management 
processes, organisational cultural barrier, and organisational learning environment are 
fundamentals for a successful implementation of KMS.  Furthermore a KMS is to 
work well within an organisational culture and support organisational learning, then 
understanding the organisation is crucial.  
 
Fundamental to KMS implementation is the understanding of Knowledge Management 
processes (KM processes). KM processes explains pertinent procedures to be followed 
to capture and make an effective use of employees’ knowledge. However, rushing into 
discussing Knowledge Management processes without a proper understanding of its 
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ingredients might lead to divergence of the concept. Therefore, this section will begin 
by explaining what is meant by knowledge and Knowledge Management and finalise 
with the core KM processes.  
 
There is no single definition of knowledge. Depending on organisation’s perspectives, 
knowledge can be defined in different ways (Fairchild 2002). There are those who 
associate knowledge and information, and those who deny. Stenmark (2002) argues 
that knowledge cannot be separated from its knower and "what can be articulated and 
made tangible outside the human mind is merely information". On the other hand, 
Marwick (2001) describes knowledge as experience and understanding of employees 
in the form of information artefacts, such as documents and reports. However, 
whichever the case knowledge is not information (Lang 2001). Information is all about 
facts while knowledge is the combination of experience, heuristics, and owner’s beliefs 
(Nonaka 1994). However, the differences between knowledge and information are 
beyond the scope of this section, much has been discussed by McDermott (1999) on 
their differences. Therefore, whatever the organisations’ perspectives about knowledge 
are, what is fundamental for KMS’ implementation is whether knowledge can be 
transferred from its owners into a computer system in a useful form. 
 
Knowledge can be categorised in two forms: tacit and explicit. What has long been 
built in human brain through experience or learning is categorised as tacit knowledge 
(Marwick 2001). This type of knowledge is highly unstructured and difficulty to 
maintain. On the other hand, the tacit knowledge that has been codified or extracted 
from human brain is what considered as explicit knowledge (Marwick 2001). This type 
of knowledge is highly simplified and easy to be maintained. All these forms of 
knowledge are essential when it comes to organisation’s performance. Further 













Knowledge of experience 
(body) 
Knowledge of rationality 
(mind) 
Information  Knowledge 
Simultaneous knowledge 
(here and how) 
Sequential knowledge 
(there and then) 
Analog knowledge (practice) Digital knowledge 
(theory) 
 
Table 3: Types of Knowledge 
(Adapted from (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.61)) 
  
As organisations started to realise the contribution of knowledge in performance 
increase and competitive advantage gain, knowledge management became an 
organisational issue (Folkens & Spiliopoulou 2004). The focus was to collect, integrate 
and reuse what an employee knows to bring about innovation and performance 
increases in an organisation (Kim & Mauborgne 2003). Moreover, due to competitive 
nature of the market, organisations need to be safe with their intellectual property 
“knowledge”. Therefore, by capturing what is in employees’ head, organisations are 
positioning themselves in a safe side. 
 
However, as with the difficulties in defining knowledge, Knowledge Management also 
has different perceptions. There are those who define Knowledge Management in 
technological, sociological, and organisational perspectives (Tochtermann, Dosinger & 
Puntschart 2004). Techno-centric focuses on tools and techniques to make Knowledge 
Management happen while social-centric emphasises on human resources. Moreover, 
organisational perspective sees knowledge as performance equalizer. However, since 
computer security focuses on improving performance of an organisation and protecting 
an organisation from external and internal threats, therefore organisational perspective 
is most valuable to this dissertation and will be discussed in more detail.   
 
Unfortunately, knowledge is messy (Allee 1997), it is tough to isolate Knowledge 
Management from Sociological, Psychological and Technology disciplines (Falbo, 
Arantes & Natali 2004). It is nearly impossible to talk about Knowledge Management 
without associating it with human elements. Likewise in technology, though 
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Knowledge Management is about people, but they need technology for effective 
communications (Rao 2002). Moreover, central to successful Knowledge Management 
is organisation’s support; therefore the organisation places itself at the centre of 
Knowledge Management (Rao 2002).  
4.2 .1  Knowledge  Management  processes  
Knowledge exists in many forms and derived from different sources within 
organisations; human, e-mails, reports and many alike. Moreover, different roles 
demands different knowledge (Andriessen & Huis in 't Veld 2001). The knowledge 
required by senior managers is quite different from those required by subordinates. 
Furthermore, knowledge like any other asset expires (Nonaka 2005, p.188). Therefore, 
it needs to be updated frequently to reflective the current organisational needs. In the 
context of security, the knowledge that required by end-users is quite different with 
those required by top-managers and security personnel as well. All these are issues that 
need to be addressed in any KMS developed.  
 
Many researchers have described knowledge management with different processes. 
Benbya and colleagues (2004) describes knowledge management into four processes; 
knowledge generation, integration, sharing and dissemination. Moreover, Alavi and 
Leidner (1999) express knowledge management in four phases; creations, capture, 
integrate and transfer. However, regardless the broadness of the description of 
knowledge management processes, they all have a common perspectives. Therefore for 
the purpose of this dissertation, four knowledge management processes will be 
considered; knowledge capture, organise, store and share, see Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Knowledge Cycle 
 
Knowledge Capture 
Word processing has contributed much in knowledge capturing (Marwick 2001). It is 
through word processing that we are writing and learning in colleges, project teams are 
exchanging ideas through report and many alike. Knowledge capturing can be defined 
as the process of articulating tacit knowledge from organisational knowledge worker 
and/or external sources into a more persistent form that can be used in future(Marwick 
2001; Nonaka 2005). However, technology is moving fast. Currently there are many 
automated tools that can capture the know-how of knowledge worker for future use. 
The emergent of voice recognition is a good example of these technologies (Marwick 
2001).  
 
However, there are barriers that must be overcome to convince knowledge worker to 
share their knowledge. Knowledge workers tend to be busy, so they do not have 
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enough time for socialisation or collaborative events. Moreover, the rigid 
organisational culture that does not entertain social interactions also has impact on 
knowledge sharing with organisations (Nonaka 2005, p.188). However, all these can 
be resolved by changing organisational culture by shifting to learning culture, and by 
introducing incentives to motivating knowledge workers to uncap their knowledge.  
Knowledge Organise 
As it was mentioned previously, articulated knowledge needs to be stored for future 
use. However, prior to its storing, it need to be organised so as to facilitate easy 
retrieve. Rao (2002) emphasises on the quality of knowledge content so as to reduce 
content search time that can have negative impact on knowledge seekers. Moreover, 
Alavi and Leidner (1999) commented on necessity for knowledge integration and 
organisation in increasing organisational competitive advantage.  
Knowledge Storage 
Now that tacit knowledge has already been articulated and content has already 
organised based on the domain, the next process of knowledge management is to store 
the content in the format that can be inferred in the future. However, this process 
resembles much with knowledge capturing. Unlike knowledge capturing, knowledge 
storing take a steps further into providing security mechanisms in the environment 
where there are many number of users. Moreover, knowledge storing provides 
indexing mechanisms that facilitates easy retrieval of knowledge content. On the other 
hand, knowledge capturing can be a traditional method of capturing tacit knowledge by 
observation which it is hard for reusing. 
 
Nonaka (2005, p.188) emphasises on context management of the stored knowledge 
content. In knowledge storing it is not about how huge your knowledge repository is. 
The crucial bit is the enough availability of knowledge context. This view is 
inconsistent with Allee’s view that the more you pin down knowledge the more it slips 
(Allee 1997). According to Nonaka (2005, p.188), poor contextual details of 
knowledge content, it is viewed as being lost. Therefore, this emphasises on the 
balance between the captured knowledge and the stored knowledge. Knowledge 
content must not be summarised to the extent to loose its meaning. 
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Knowledge Sharing 
This is the backbone of knowledge creation (Nonaka 1995, p.56). According to Alavi 
and Leidner (1999), knowledge is useless if it is not shared. The captured, organised 
and stored knowledge must be accessible to employees at large to stimulate new 
insights and innovations so as to improve the productivity of the organisation. 
Knowledge sharing involves trust between employees (Lang 2001; Rao 2002). Again 
this is an organisational culture problem. As it was explained previously, organisations 
should encourage knowledge workers by introducing recognition award and loosening 
it cultural norms.  
 
Knowledge sharing involves knowledge searching and retrieval. There are two mostly 
deployed model for knowledge retrieval; push and pull (Alavi & Leidner 1999; 
Nonaka 2005). The pull model is a traditional model that involves search for and 
retrieve of knowledge based on specific content keywords, while in push model 
knowledge seeker is being notified on the posts of new knowledge content. For 
instance, in Wiki based collaborative KMS, when a new member adds comments or 
new content, each member is informed about the new “arrival”. On the other hand, 
the former approach members do not receive any notifications about the content.  
4.2 .2  Knowledge  transformation  process  
Central to the successful of organisation is how people exchange information and 
communicate with one another in everyday company life (Davenport & Probst 2002, 
p.111). This information, in terms of knowledge, comes into different forms and 
members exchange this information in different ways. Employees interact with KMS 
either as knowledge provider, seekers or intermediaries. Knowledge between them 
circulates in different formats. Knowledge seekers retrieve articulated knowledge 
while providers share their tacit knowledge with intermediaries ready to be fed in 
KMS. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how different forms of knowledge can be 
transformed within an organisation. 
.  
As mentioned previously, knowledge can broadly take two forms; tacit and explicit. 
Tacit is what resides inside human brain while with explicit, it is any form of 
knowledge that has been articulated from human brain (Marwick 2001). Furthering the 
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notation of tacit-explicit, Nonaka and Takeuchi proposed a knowledge-conversions 
model called SECI which has four processes, see figure 8 (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 
pp.56-94). The model elaborates how different forms of knowledge can be captured 
and created between employees within an organisation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, 
p.57). Therefore, it is worthwhile to bring its discussion in this section because for a 
successful building KMS an understanding of how knowledge circulates within the 
organisation is crucial.  
 
 
Figure 8: Spiral of knowledge 
 
Socialisation 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.62) defines socialisation as the process of creating 
knowledge among employees by sharing their tacit knowledge. They went further and 
ascertained that in this process knowledge can be shared within employees without 
using any language. However, their view conflicts with Allees’ view (1997) that 
knowledge travels via language, therefore without language it is impossible for 
   60
knowledge sharing. Nonaka and Takeuchi overlooked that evening eyes blinking is 
also a form of language. Therefore, following this view, it is correct to say that tacit 
knowledge can also be shared without speaking or writing, but instead through 
observation and practice (Gronau, Muller & Uslar 2004).  
 
Knowledge is self-organising; it needs clear boundaries for it to succeed (Allee 1997). 
On the other hand, management buy-ins is crucial for establishment of the clear path 
for knowledge to flow within organisation (Bixler 2002). Therefore, it is necessary for 
organisation to understand the needs for social activities within organisation. Much can 
be exchanged during coffee break; employees have a good chance of exchanging what 
they know during these meetings. Furthermore, this phase can be useful to determine 
who shares what with whom.  
Externalisation 
In externalisation phase tacit knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge. This is 
when one tries to express her idea about something by either writing it down in 
plaintext, drawing sketches, models or metaphors (Gronau, Muller & Uslar 2004). A 
very common example of this form of knowledge conversion is during seminars or 
proposal presentations. This is when knowledge can be captured for future use in 
creating new insights (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.66).  
 
However, this should go in parallel with the type of audience. Different user category 
requires different approaches of material deliverance. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand the type of audience before planning for material to be delivered. This 
directly associates with designing of KMS because one needs to understand different 
mode of material presentation for targeted users. 
Combination 
Explicit knowledge exists in different forms in an organisation. They might be in email 
as plaintext, images and/or video (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995, p.67). In this phase, these 
different formats of explicit knowledge are reformatted and combined to form more 
meaningful knowledge. For instance, when systems analysts meet with designing 
team, they combine their conceptual system models to form a blueprint of the final 
system.  
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This phase is essential in security context where different explicit knowledge from 
different sources will need to be combined to educate users on security threats. These 
sources might be external security experts, public security websites, anti-virus software 
vendors and many alike. All these sources have different forms of explicit knowledge. 
Therefore, this should be taken into account when designing KMS. 
Internalisation 
This is explicit-to-tacit knowledge conversion. What has been articulated and stored in 
knowledge base need to be accessed and probably create new insights. The tacit 
knowledge that has been digitised from externalisation and combination phases is 
accessed by other employees to help them deal with the problem in hand. This is what 
is termed as learn-from-past.  
 
However, this directly associates with the knowledge content. Rao (2002) emphasises 
on organisational participatory approach in validating knowledge content. It is this 
content that determines the successful of KMS. Knowledge is made for people 
therefore it should reflect their needs by having relevant material.  
4.3 Organisational learning  
In the previous sections, section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, much has been discussed about what 
it takes for knowledge to be shared and created among employees. However, there is a 
lot to knowledge sharing and creation. There must be a favourable environment that 
will enable smooth knowledge sharing. This section focuses on how to go about 
getting employees to participate in making organisation knowledge being utilised to its 
perfections.  
 
In an organisational context, knowledge is useless without sharing, so as in 
information security (Alavi & Leidner 1999). Introducing computer security to 
employees’ daily activities is like adding burden to their tasks. Without proper 
arrangements to prepare them in participating in computer security knowledge sharing, 
things could fall apart. Therefore, it is mandatory to understanding the ingredients of 
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organisational learning so as to combat ourselves with the heavy task that we have 
ahead of us. 
4.3.1  What  is  organisational  learning? 
Prior to delving into the ingredients of organisational learning, it is crucial to clearly 
understand what it meant by organisational learning. The term organisational learning 
and learning organisation are used interchangeably. While learning organisation 
express the environment where learning activities are undertaken, organisational 
learning express the actual process of learning (Denton 1999, p.16). Denton (1999, 
p.17) defines organisational learning as the process of improving actions through 
which new ideas and innovations are built and shared to create better knowledge and 
understand. However, the discussion on what constitutes learning organisation and 
organisational learning is beyond the scope of this section. This section will only 
concentrates on what constitute on organisational learning. 
 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p.44) proposed two types of learning activities. They 
argued that the first learning activities concentrates on creating know-how for specific 
problem domain while the second type of learning involves establishing new beliefs to 
wipe out the existing ones. However, for the purpose of this dissertation all these types 
are of importance since employees within an organisation need to be combated with 
specific knowledge of fighting against computer threats while they also need to pass 
past their previous beliefs that computer security is not of their concerns. In short, 
organisation that need to improve its performance it must introduce learning 
environment that will change its employees from being egocentric to altruistic. 
 
Denton (1999, p.20) proposed six reasons to why an organisation should shift to 
learning process. These includes shift to production factors, acceptance of knowledge 
asset, volatility nature of business, dissatisfaction among managers and employees, the 
increase of competitive nature and high customers’ bargaining power. All these 
reasons are applicable to the problem domain of this dissertation. However, the 
volatility nature of business fits more with computer security domain.  Computer 
threats are evolving in unimaginably speed. 
   63
4.3.2  Senge’s  organisational  learning  process  
Understanding what it meant by organisational learning, and its difference from 
learning organisation is not enough to introduce learning process within an 
organisation. Having spotted this illness, Senge (1990) proposed a practical approach 
of organisational learning model. According to Senge, for an organisation to shift to 
learning environment it needs to undergo five steps. Therefore, the whole of this 
section will concentrate on exploring what constitutes in each step. However, it should 
also be noted that the order in which these steps are does not matter. 
 Personal mastery 
Lang (2001) argues that “It is knowledge that holds a firm together” and organisations 
learn from employees’ participation in communities that have philosophy, practice and 
formal means of communication. It is therefore prudent for organisation to understand 
employees’ contributions in organisational competitive gain, and support these 
communities. However, employees also must play their role in participating in their 
growth and development plans (Senge & Audio 1990). 
 
Dervitsiotis (1998) defines personal mystery as a continually discipline of sharpening 
our knowledge. It is clear from the definition that emphasis is on ever-ending process 
of learning. However, as previously pointed out, organisation’s management must 
appreciate employees’ contribution by facilitating learning activities, while on the 
other hand employees are responsible for participating in learning process. Therefore, 
the process of knowledge creation relies on employees with little input from 
management.  
 Shared vision 
“…share knowledge involves uncapping our thinking processes for others in the 
present moment” (Lang 2001). This statement emphasises on community 
consciousness. If employees open to others what they think it is valuable for 
organisation, they can share and discuss different views and come up with a 
community decision “shared vision”. In other words, shared vision is a common view 
for community members.  
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Senge (1990) argues if there is shared view, employees feel the sense of ownership and 
thus lead to unlocking of their ideas and open the gateway for innovations. This 
discipline has some affinity with three principle of fair process (Kim & Mauborgne 
2003). The principle emphasises on employees’ engagement, explanation and 
expectations clarity. Engagement emphasises on employees participations, while 
explanation emphasises on awareness and expectations clarity emphasises on 
management decision stability. 
 Mental models 
According to Senge (1990, p.235) mental models are the image, assumptions and 
stories which we carry in our mind. It is this models that make people judge things 
differently.  Mental models associates with human belief and it is this belief that 
change the attitude of someone. Mental models are also generative (Senge 1990, 
p.242). However, mental model are difficult to exercise, it need a plenty of time to 
create and master similar views in a team.  
 Systems thinking 
“...find a solution, not culprit” (Senge & Audio 1990). Do not delve to wash oil drop 
from a car without knowing the hole and root cause of it. This discipline emphasises 
on finding the solution to a problem and not solves the problem at first glance. This 
discipline is similar to Root Cause Analysis, a problem solving technique that 
emphasises on determining the original cause prior to solving the problem. .  
 
This is the core of organisational learning. All disciplines we have so far explained are 
not enough without system thinking. As emphasised by Senge (1990), system thinking 
discipline is a fusion point of other remaining disciplines. 
 Team learning 
According to Senge and Audio (1990) team learning is the process of aligning and 
developing the capacity of a team to create the results its members truly desire. Senge 
(1990), argues that team learning has three critical dimensions in organisation; the 
need to brainstorm about complex problem, creating innovations and as the member of 
other learning teams. However, there is no such morale within organisations. Team 
learning fits in sports like teams. 
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Contrary, Senge (1990) argues that with this nature of business, team learning is badly 
needed within organisations. He emphasises that the successful of an organisation is 
dependent to the successfulness of such teams within the organisation.  
 
Now we know what knowledge management, with its processes, is capable of. We 
know many, if not all, barriers that can hinder us from utilising the fruits of knowledge 
management. Fortunately, Senge has provided us with the way to overcome these 
barriers. However, the problem still persists; how can we apply Senge’s discipline to 
overcome these barriers? Nonaka (1994, p.188), proposed the introduction of 
community of practice as a solution. Therefore the next section will discuss how 
community of practice can resolve these barriers. 
4.3.3  Communi ties  of  Prac tice  
For an organisation to be successful knowledge must be shared within its members, 
knowledge that is not shared is useless (Alavi & Leidner 1999). But the problem is, 
how can an organisation make its employee share what they have? Through motivating 
them with rewards, or impressing them with sophisticated technologies? Though all 
these approaches have credibility, employees tend to learn more through participation 
in small groups of people who interact regularly (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.108). 
Therefore, it is necessary for organisation to understand and support human 
relationships within their organisations. 
 
The phenomenon of Communities of Practice (CoP) emerged in 1990’s when a study 
to investigate group of Xerox technicians proved that employees tend to behave 
differently when they work into groups (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.117).  The study 
showed that there are differences between work procedures and the actual working 
procedures. The study explained Xerox’s technicians when faced with technical 
problems. Technicians tend to ignore technical manuals and instead seek for help from 
their colleagues (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.117). 
 
Knowledge is about people, if well managed then they will be able to share what they 
have and adopt that trend. Allee (1997) argues that knowledge seeks community. 
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Moreover, Lave and Wegner (1991) defines community of practices as collaborative, 
interactive networks of individuals who have the same mission of learning about a 
problem domain of a specified scope. All these emphasise on the fact human 
relationships within organisations is a crucial attitude to practice. To emphasise on 
this, Lang (2001) argues that in order for organisation to succeed, Knowledge 
Management should exhale its boundaries and establish human relationship. 
 
Lave and Wenger (1991) argues that CoP can be differentiated from ordinary 
communities like groups or teams by three unique characteristics; domain, community, 
and practice. Domain explains the scope of the community whereas Community 
explains the way member of the community gather to discuss their matters. Moreover, 
Practice explains specialisation of the community. These characteristics differentiate 
CoP from other communities because in groups like team-fans they do not have 
common practices.  
 
For instance, the CoP formulated by Knowledge Mapping and Structuring Unit at 
Unilever originated from food production company with the aim of enhancing 
efficiency in production and improve innovative processes. The CoP was organised 
due to the need of new production. After member being assigned, they were brought in 
a one week workshop to discuss different strategies in solving the problem at hand 
(Andriessen & Huis in 't Veld 2001). The italicised words explain the domain, practice 
and community of the CoP as proposed by Lave and Wenger (1991). 
 
CoP can be formulated using two approaches; bottom-up and top-down approaches. 
Davenport and Probst (2002, p.109) explains bottom-up approach as a CoP initiative 
that lead to the establishment of a formal CoP within an organisation. This explanation 
can be associated with the establishment of central office for the interlinking of 
knowledge management activities at Siemens. At Siemens, this approach was initiated 
by informal committed members of Knowledge Management staff. This approach 
normally has positive feedback because they are initiated by the doers.  
 
On the other hand, top-down approach is the CoP initiative from top managers to 
subordinates. This explanation can be associated with Unilever CoP (Andriessen & 
Huis in 't Veld 2001). At Unilever, management prepared a team by selecting on expert 
   67
who is committed and ten to twenty other members to join the CoP. However, this 
approach mostly fails because employees feel to be dragged, unless the management is 
smart enough to know when and how to formulate the CoP.  
 
Since CoP comprises of members with specific objectives, therefore to establish CoP 
there must be some processes to be followed. Whatever the approach, bottom-up or 
top-down, there are must be an initiator of the community who needs to sale his idea 
about what he intends to do and for what purpose. If other employees buy the idea, 
then follows the actual execution of the community. However, the execution of the 
community need to be evaluated, if it meets the CoP’s objectives and fulfils members’ 
desires then the community continues to operate, and if not then it has to end.  
 
These processes are what Davenport and Probst (2002, p.109) referred to as CoP 
lifecycle. In their explanation, they suggested that a CoP falls into three phases for 
their operations. As it can be seen on figure 9, CoP comprises of three phases; start-up, 
run and improve, and wind-down phase, each with different operations. The 




Figure 9: CoP Lifecycle 
(Adapted from (Davenport & Probst 2002, p.149)) 
 Start-up 
This is the awareness phase where members of the community are being told the 
purpose of the CoP and its scope. This normally is being done by base members of the 
community. The community leaders are being selected and members establish their 
mode of conducting their meetings. Though, if the community is virtually, instead 
members will define the technology to assist their meetings. 
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 Run and improve 
This is the operational phase. This is when the community come into actual execution 
of the community. This is the actual knowledge sharing and creation phase where 
members meet for solving the problem in hand. However, constant monitoring of the 
community will be performed in this phase to make sure it operates with its objectives. 
 Wind-down 
Community should exist as long as it serves its purposes. Based on the evaluation, the 
community may be closed down and the knowledge created in the knowledge base 
copied and transferred into another CoP or being stored for future use. Meanwhile, if 
the community happen to fulfil and excel its objectives then it will continue to exist. 
4.4 Computing for Knowledge Management  
Knowledge is power and by sharing we add more into it. Consider a very simple 
scenario where employee ‘A’ happens to have a problem in login into her account and 
after consulting employee ‘B’, he discovered that the problem was a buffer overflow. 
After a simple demonstration from employee ‘B’, she managed to fix the problem. 
From this scenario, two components of Knowledge Management are regarded to be 
essential for performance improvement; knowledge sharing and creation. Employee 
‘B’ agreed to share his knowledge about how to clear buffer overflow while employee 
‘A’ learned how to fix the problem so it would not bother her if it happens again. 
 
However, two essential questions arise from this scenario. The first question is how do 
employees communicate their problems with their colleagues, and second, if they 
manage to communicate, in whichever way, how is the shared knowledge going to be 
captured for reuse? This adds a third component for improving organisational 
performance; knowledge reuse. Knowledge is a valuable asset that needs to be 
managed like, or even more than, any other assets. Today employee ‘B’ is there to 
answer the queries, but what about tomorrow? Would he be there when he is needed?  
 
“Prevention is better than cure”; it is a common axiom that we have been gossiping in 
our life, but yet we fail to practice its context when it is required to. Tomorrow is 
beyond our scope; anything can happen. Employee ‘B’ might quit the job, or even be 
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in a short holiday where he can not be reached. Whichever the reasons, proactive 
measures must be taken by making “back ups” of whatever has contributed to the 
improvement of organisational performance. However, this does not only put the 
organisation in a safe side, but also quantifies organisation’s capabilities. From the 
“backups”, new strategies can be initiated. 
 
Although knowledge sharing, creation and reuse have been identified as fundamental 
components for performance improvement, still there are a lot that need to be done to 
make them alive. Organisational cultural change is of the most common prerequisite 
for their effective execution. The barriers between employees must be resolved; they 
should be opened and understand the benefits of sharing. However, the organisational 
cultural change is beyond the scope of this section, only enablers of the identified 
components will be discussed in this section.  
 
Unfortunately, you can not make somebody to create new knowledge. The process of 
knowledge creation is the association of learning process and the learner. Therefore, 
the process of knowledge creation is ignored in this section. In other words, there are 
no technological enablers for making someone instil new knowledge. This section will 
conclude by identifying the roles technology plays in enabling the execution of these 
components as recognised in literature. 
4.4.1  Computing overview  
Prior to answering the questions arouse in the previous scenario, it is worthwhile to 
investigate what it meant by computing and identify generic roles of computing in 
Knowledge Management. Fairchild (2002) defines Knowledge Management enablers 
as structures and attributes that must be in place for a successful knowledge 
management program. Although KPMG (2000) and Rao (2002) proposed eight 
enablers of knowledge management, this section will only concentrate with 
technological enabler. 
 
Building on Oxford’s definition, computing is the action or practice of using 
computers. Computer provides massive storage of data and high processing speed. 
Incorporated with its applications, intranet, internet and other web applications, 
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computers reduces the gap of space and hence makes communication easier. In 
summary, computers can provide massive storage of information, high information 
manipulation speed, and global communication and also provides with searching 
capabilities which can be useful if applied to Knowledge Management processes. 
 
It is true that knowledge sharing can stand on its own without the help of technology. 
However, to be effectively technology must be there to support its capture and 
organisational wide accessibility (Rao 2002; Alavi & Leidner 1999). Stenmark (2002) 
argues, "…for KMS to be successful they must include users and provide mechanisms 
for these users to locate and interact with each other". The issue of technology 
resonates most in an enterprise environments where knowledge need to be centrally 
stored and its accessibility need to be enhanced to reach employees at large.  
 
The concept of computing for Knowledge Management can be explained using C3S 
model as proposed by the author (2008). In his work, the author described four roles 
computing plays in Knowledge Management; capture, store, search and share, as 
shown in figure 10. This view is in the same line with that of Alavi and Leidner (1999) 
that Knowledge Management requires database and database management, 
communication and messaging, and browsing and retrieval technologies. However, 
they ignored the technology for knowledge capturing. 
 
The first component of the C3S model is Capture which reflects the category of 
technologies that are useful in knowledge acquisition process, these includes video and 
audio capturing devices. The second component is Store which presents all 
technologies that are useful in knowledge storing, these includes knowledge base, data 
management systems. The third category, which includes expert locators and yellow 
pages, are represented by Search component of the model. The final component, 
Share, reflects all collaborative technologies that assist in knowledge sharing, these 
includes Web 2.0 applications and intranet. 
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Figure 10: C3S Model 
 
However, both these technologies can be combined into two categories. Hansen and 
colleagues (2005) argues technology can support Knowledge Management in two 
basic approaches; codification and personalisation. In codification, unstructured 
knowledge is transformed and stored into common format for future use. It combines 
all technologies that fall under Capture and Store components of C3S model. This 
approach proves to be more useful because it build a gap between capture and store; 
once knowledge has been captured it has been stored already. However, it is also 
should be noted that knowledge capturing does not always implies that knowledge is 
being stored.  
 
Moreover, personalisation approach focuses on enabling two parties to communicate 
by both providing means of searching for experts and direct communicating with them. 
Again this approach proves to be useful because it plays twofold roles. Firstly it allows 
for expert searching and secondly it enables two parties to directly communicate. The 
C3S model considers search and share as two separate entities, but logically we search 
for expert because we want to communicate with them. Therefore, these two 
components must go hand to hand.  
 
However, the codification approach is dependent to personalisation approach. If for 
instance Web 2.0 is applied as the means of establishing communication between two 
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ends, therefore the knowledge will be stored in the form of plaintext, video and audio 
but it differs when the technology changes. If the technology applied change to, for 
instance video and audio capturing systems, then text format would not be applicable. 
Therefore, based on the above exploration, the approach proposed by Hansen and 
colleagues (2005) will be applied as a guideline for answering the questions below as 
aroused from the scenario of section 4.4.  
4.4.2  How  do  employees  communicate  thei r  problems? 
This question can be answered by the personalisation approach. As previously 
explained technological enabler in this question serves dual roles. Firstly, by providing 
employee “A” with search capabilities to search for the right person to consult, and 
then it enables the communication of the two ends; employee “A” and “B”. Mosaic of 
technological enablers can be applied in this question, these includes expert locator, 
yellow pages, direct phone line, email and collaboration tools like Web 2.0 and 
intranet.  
 
Thanks to the advancement of technology. Technology have made the world as a 
single village, therefore technology removes the gap of space that otherwise would 
limit knowledge sharing (Marwick 2001). However, mush should be considered for the 
case of material accessibility and not direct communication with the expert. In 
enterprise environment where there are many roles and knowledge accessibility is 
sensitive, there should be a mechanisms to prevent unauthorised access. With User 
Profiling capability of technology, each user can be assigned limited privileges to 
access the contents based on their roles. 
4.4.3  How  is  the  shared  knowledge  going to  be  captured  for  reuse? 
This can be answered with the first approach, codification approach. Recap, in 
codification, unstructured knowledge is transformed and stored into common format 
for future use. As previously explained this approach is dependant to personalisation 
approach. Whichever the technology applied in personalisation approach, the most 
common technologies are database and database management, knowledge base, 
knowledge repository, content and data management and many alike.  
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In an enterprise environment where knowledge comes from different domains, 
organising of this knowledge is of essential so as to facilitate its fast retrieval (Rao 
2002). In associate with this approach, other categories of technologies are being 
applied. These technologies include taxonomy, thesaurus and metadata. Their main 
task is content organisation based on domain, practice and owner of that document.  
 
Moreover, knowledge tends to vary with time. What was useful today, tomorrow it 
might be obsolete. Therefore, codification technologies must be capable to allow these 
changes. The underlying technology must be able to allow periodic amendments of the 
content in totality or portion of it. It should also keep track of who, when and where 
the modifications occurred. 
4.5 Knowledge management systems 
The economy has changed from product-based to knowledge-based. In knowledge-
based economy, knowledge has been identified as a valuable asset to improve 
organisation’s performance and competitive gain as well. However, the challenge 
arouse on how to convince knowledge workers to uncap what they have and share with 
others in an organisation. In an organisational context, knowledge is limited if it is not 
shared within employees. Many researchers proposed the need of learning activities to 
facilitate knowledge sharing. In 1990 Senge proposed a model for assisting 
organisation to shift into learning organisation.  
 
Many researchers suggest the use of technology to assist in learning environment 
(Bixler 2002; Rao 2002; Malhotra 2005). Pondering on the matter, author (2008), and 
Hansen and colleagues (2005) proposed models that can be used to categorise 
technologies that required for facilitating knowledge sharing within an organisational 
context. Author (2008) proposed C3S model that focus on categorising technologies 
for knowledge capturing, storing, searching and sharing. Moreover, Hansen and 
colleagues (2005) categorised technologies for knowledge codification and 
personalisation. However none of these models established the connection between 
technology and KMS as Knowledge Management initiatives. Therefore, this section 
will focus on exploring what constitute to KMS and its applicable features into 
assisting knowledge sharing. 
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4.5.1  Types  of  Knowledge  Management  Systems  
In an organisational context, KMS are perceived as a central knowledge bank that 
keeps records of all past successful examples in solving a specific problem (Bernard 
2006). Alavi and Leidner (1999) define KMS as a new breed of computer applications 
that focus on creating, gathering, organising, and disseminating organisational 
knowledge.  
 
KMS differ from ordinary transactional systems like MIS in a number of ways. 
Information, which is in term of knowledge, is stored in an unstructured way in KMS 
(Bernard 2006). Moreover, unlike MIS, there exists only three categories of roles that 
interacts with KMS; knowledge seekers, providers and intermediaries (Markus 2001). 
Knowledge seekers are those who refer to the already existing knowledge, while 
knowledge providers are domain experts “knowledge workers”. On the other hand, 
knowledge intermediaries are those who are responsible for maintaining knowledge 
content (Markus 2001). 
 
As it was mentioned previously technology plays two essential roles in knowledge 
creation process. It enables knowledge providers to directly share their “know-how’s” 
with knowledge seekers. Moreover, it also enables knowledge intermediary to 
structure knowledge providers’ “know-how’s” into useful format that can be easily 
retrieved in future by themselves, knowledge seekers or knowledge intermediary as 
well.  
 
However, each of the scenarios explained in the previous paragraph depends on a 
specific or combination of technologies. For instance, technology that can be used for 
personalisation can never replace the technology for codification, but still they can be 
combined to operate in ad hoc environment. Therefore it is plausible to understand 
different categories of Knowledge Management “generators”.  
 
Although there are many types of KMS, Bernard (2006) proposed three categories of 
KMS generators which can effectively be used to categorise KMS. In his article, 
Bernard explains that generators are the go-by of applications, and are these 
applications which we are interested with. Therefore, this section the generators 
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explained by Bernard are going to be used as the framework to describe different types 
of KMS. 
 Knowledge repositories  
King and colleagues (2002) defines knowledge repositories as databases that allow the 
storage and retrieval of knowledge content. These include data warehousing, document 
repositories, document management system (Hahn & Subramani 2000; Marwick 
2001). Davenport, De Long & Beers (1998) went further to categorise knowledge 
repositories into three categories; external, structural internal and informal internal. 
External knowledge repositories for the storage of intellectual intelligence while 
structural internal repository such as research reports, marketing material and 
techniques and methods. Moreover, informal internal repositories are for storage and 
retrieval of business best practices (King, Marks Jr & McCoy 2002). 
 Expert directories 
These are tools that are specifically for finding knowledge workers. These include 
expert networks, yellow pages, expert database and many alike. Unlike knowledge 
repositories, expert directory only stores information about the expert (Hahn & 
Subramani 2000). However, other expert directories both find people with knowledge 
that one requires and enable it to be transferred to the knowledge seekers. These tools 
that locate the destination of experts are referred to yellow pages. 
 Collaborative tools 
These are tools that assist access between users (Hahn & Subramani 2000). These 
types of tools include discussion forums, Wiki, Portals, video conferencing and many 
alike. The unique feature that distinguishes this category with the previous is the 
ability to facilitate collaboration events. 
4.5.2  Selecting appropriate  tools  KMS  
Having a tool without knowing where to apply it, it is like the tool does not exist at all. 
One should understand where it should be applied so as to make it effective. Due to 
successful of KMS into improving organisation performance, many KM 
“applications” have emerged. However, the burden to select between these tools is left 
to Knowledge Managers (Hahn & Subramani 2000). Hahn and Subramani argue that 
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managers need to be directed to what scenario does specific category of KMS is 
suitable. 
 
Tackling this problem, Kankanhalli and colleagues (2003) proposed product-service 
approach to assist executives in choosing the right KMS to deploy in their 
management initiatives. In this approach they associate KMS with the type of the 
organisation.  They classified organisation in two classes; product-based and service-
based. They went further and split the organisation in two subclasses; high-volatile and 
low-volatile. The first category differentiates the organisations based on their nature 
while the latter classification explains how un/stable organisation is with its nature. 
Therefore an organisation can be categorised as product-based and high-volatile. This 
means it is a production organisation that often changes its products. 
 
 
Figure 11:  Product-Service KMS Support Model 
 Product-Based Organisations in Low-Volatility Context  
As shown on Figure 11, this category reflects organisations that their competitive force 
is based on products. These organisations mainly depend on tacit knowledge and tend 
to have a lot of informal and formal CoP’s. Therefore all organisation that fall in this 
category, and if they fully depend on tacit knowledge, then personalisation approach is 
suitable 
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 Product-Based Organisations in High-Volatility Context 
All organisations that operate in an environment where the rate of innovation is high 
and products are associated with many deadlines, knowledge need to be provided in a 
real time manner. In this category both types of KMS are suitable to make sure 
knowledge is available in a required timeframe. 
 Service-Based Organisations in a Low-Volatility Context 
In this category, the wealth of knowledge accumulated by these organisations and the 
ability to use this knowledge to serve their clients is a key value proposition. Therefore 
KMS required in this category is for knowledge content storage. 
 Service-Based Organisations in a High-Volatility Context 
In this category service is their competitive force and business environment is 
dynamic. Therefore the time required for knowledge content is crucial. Therefore this 
approach can adopt personalisation approach like face-to-face communications.  
 
This approach has proved to be useful because prior to selecting for KMS, it considers 
the nature of the organisation by looking at competitive driving forces. It reflects real 
operations of the organisations.  
4.6 Conc lusion  
This chapter aimed at investigating key processes of knowledge management and 
appropriate features of KMS in improving security awareness. The discussion of 
fundamentals of knowledge management is provided in section two where both 
knowledge management processes and knowledge transformation process are 
discussed. In this discussion, organisational culture has been identified as a central to 
successful of KMS implementation. In section three, the discussion of organisational 
learning has been conducted where CoPs has been identified as the key solution to 
overcome organisational cultural barriers in implementing KMS. 
 
The discussion of the usefulness of computing in knowledge management has been 
conducted in section four where four roles of technology have been identified in 
relation to knowledge management. These roles include capture, store, search and 
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share where capture describes all technologies that are useful in knowledge capturing, 
and so forth. The description of KMS and its criterion of selecting what category to be 
implemented in a specific organisation were provided in section five. In this 
discussion, three features of KMS has been identified; repository, expert directory and 
collaborative. 
 
In this chapter, employees’ knowledge sharing and the roles KMS plays in facilitating 
organisational learning have been identified as the driving factors for improving 
organisation’s performance. However, knowledge sharing constitutes many knowledge 
management processes and different features of KMS apply in different scenarios. 
Therefore, the next chapter provides the discussion of knowledge management 
perspectives of security awareness emphasising on how KMS can be useful in 
improving security awareness. 
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5 THE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
OF SECURITY AWARENESS 
5.1 Introduction  
There is no doubt that high security awareness decreases the number of computer 
break-ins because users starts practicing and applying good security traits (Sharp 2007, 
p.3). However, there is more into improving users’ awareness in security issues than 
just the dissemination of security policies and expecting users to immediately adopt 
require practice. From preceding chapters it is evident that many of the issues to be 
dealt with in security awareness are concerned with the human element and effectively 
sharing knowledge among the human element and protecting the knowledge of the 
organisation.  
 
This chapter explores the issues of security awareness and developing security 
awareness programmes from a knowledge management perspective. The factors which 
influence security awareness are discussed from knowledge management perspective. 
Since one of the key areas identified for failure of current security awareness is 
organisational culture and security culture in particular, this chapter discusses the 
issues involved and in particular organisational learning in the context of security 
awareness. The chapter concludes by linking the problems to current security 
awareness to the appropriate knowledge management issues and activities that can be 
used to address these. 
5.2 Why  is Security  Awareness  a  KM Problem? 
Shapr (2007, p.3) proposed three factors that must be considered to ensure users are 
aware with computer threats:  
• Knowledge: The user knows of the existence of a potential problem with 
respect to safety or security – for example, she knows that a computer virus 
may be spread by e-mail;  
• Understanding: The user understands how to deal with a safety or security 
problem – for example, she knows that a virus scanner can be used to detect 
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and remove virus from incoming e-mail, and knows how to install and set up 
such a scanner;  
• Compliance: The user acts correctly in order to avoid a safety or security 
problem – for example, she in fact installs and sets up a virus scanner to detect 
and remove virus from incoming e-mail.  
 
Senge (1990) emphasises on team learning and shared vision. Team learning 
emphasises on aligning and developing the capacity of a team to create the desired out, 
while shared vision emphasise on community view. Therefore, security personnel and 
users as a team should share their knowledge to create desired output as a team, and 
they should help each other as a team to build the same view on fighting against 
computer threats. If they work together as a team, security policies compliance will 
definitely increase so as computer security. 
5.3 Organisational security  culture  
As it was pointed out in chapter 3, users’ are treated as a separate entity when it comes 
to security. They are not involved when it comes to security decision making. Security 
awareness materials are prepared without users’ input as result security awareness 
programme(s) turn out to be unsuccessful. On the other hand, researchers emphasises 
on security and organisational culture consideration when building security awareness 
programme(s) but things are vice-versa when it comes to actual implementation. 
Security awareness programme(s) are channelled into communications media that are 
not convenient for all levels of employees. All these emphasise the gap that exists 
between security personnel and end-users.  
 
Central to all these is security organisational culture. Organisations need to shift to 
security learning environment to resolve the gap between end-users and security 
personnel. The battle between bad guys and good guys is an endless battle. While one 
side concentrate on providing tight control measures, the other side keeps their eyes 
wide open to seek for a breakthrough (Robila & Ragucci 2006). Therefore 
organisations need to build teamwork to harness employees’ skills to fighting against 
this battle (Schlienger & Teufel 2003). If this gap will be resolved then computer 
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security will be an organisational issue and hence decrease the rate of computer threats 
and break-ins.  
 
Fortunately, human element is a precious asset in knowledge management. As it was 
described in chapter 4, central to the success of organisation is employees’ knowledge 
sharing with KMS at the centre of it. Knowledge management emphasises on 
overcoming negative cultural elements by introducing learning environment, while on 
the other hand KMS are champions on facilitating learning environment. Therefore, 
since the solution for failure of security awareness programme(s) is users’ involvement 
in security decision making, and shifting to security learning environment has been 
proposed to resolve the gap between end-users and security personnel, KMS will then 
be perfect facilitator for security knowledge capturing, organising, storing and sharing 
between users and security personnel. 
 
However, it is worthwhile exploring security learning cycles to have a clear picture of 
what constitutes in it. Therefore, this section discusses Security Learning Continuum 
as proposed by American’s National Institute of Standards and Technology and 
Security Learning Cycle proposed by Microsoft. NIST’s approach is preferred because 
it is a standard body for American’s private and organisational agencies. Therefore it is 
a good benchmarking. Moreover, Microsoft was included in this section because of the 
influence it has in computer systems security. The strategies will be assessed and 
findings will be incorporated into the framework developed as part of this dissertation 
which will be discussed later. 
5.3.1  NIST’s  Security Learning  Continuum  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology was originally founded as the 
National Bureau of Standards in 1901, works to strengthen U.S. industry’s 
competitiveness; advance science and engineering; and improve public health, safety, 
and the environment. In 1988, NIST was established by the US congress with the duty 
to assist, improve, modernise, ensure reliability and facilitate rapid commercialisation 
of products based on new scientific discoveries (NIST-SP 800 – 16 1998).  
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The basic function of NIST, of which it is the main concern of this section, is to 
develop, maintain, and retain custody of the national standards of measurement, and 
provide the means and methods for comparing standards used in science, engineering, 
manufacturing, commerce, industry, and education with the standards adopted or 
recognised by the Federal Government (NIST-SP 800 – 16 1998).  
 
NIST describes security learning as a continuum. It describes the process of learning 
starting with security awareness then to security learning and finalises with security 
education and experience, see figure 12. The model describes the mandatory route to 
be followed to acquire necessary computer systems’ security knowledge. Therefore if 
someone wishes to change to or being assigned with different role, then he/she must 
follow the model to acquire necessary knowledge for that specific role. 
 
Since the relationship between security awareness, security training, and education and 
experience has already been discussed in section 3.2.2, therefore this section only 
concentrates on their briefly descriptions in the context of this model. However, 
detailed explanation focuses on the description of the inner-steps between each phase 
of the model.  
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Figure 12: Security Learning Continuum 
(Source: (NIST-SP 800 – 50 2003)) 
 
As shown on figure 12, security awareness determines execution of the remaining 
phases of the model. Since the model mirrors necessary steps to be followed to acquire 
necessary security knowledge, and since it is the first element in the model therefore 
there is no exception for its attending. Security awareness target all users regardless 
their roles and expertise. It is this phase where users are being prepared, by changing 
their behaviours, for the next level of learning continuum. 
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As it was explained in the previously, security awareness focuses on changing users’ 
behaviour on computer security so as to fulfil defined security requirements. Security 
training, on the other hand, focuses on imparting users with appropriate knowledge and 
skills to deal with specific computer systems’ problems. Therefore to resolve the 
knowledge gap, there must be a transitional stage; “Security Basics and Literacy”.  
 
Not everybody in the organisation is a computer expert or working with computer 
systems, unless it is a computer related organisation. In training phase, only computer 
systems’ experts and anybody who interacts with computer systems are targeted. 
Therefore, “Security Basics and Literacy” focuses in preparing computer systems 
technical users with basic knowledge and skills that are required to be emphasised in 
security training. Notice here, the material prepare are also quite different with those 
used in user awareness phase so as with training material.  
 
After “Security Basics and Literacy,” training becomes focused on providing 
knowledge, skills, and abilities specific to an individual’s “Roles and Responsibilities 
Relative to IT Systems.” At this level, training recognises differences between 
beginning, intermediate, and advanced skill requirements. 
 
The "Education and Experience” level focuses on developing the ability and vision to 
perform complex multi-disciplinary activities and the skills needed to further the IT 
security profession and to keep pace with threat and technology changes. 
5.3.2  Microsoft  Security Learn ing  Cyc le  
After realising its potentials computer systems security, Microsoft contributed to the 
body of knowledge by proposing a security learning cycle which intends to assist its 
customers by providing a security learning framework. This framework can be used by 
computer systems administrators and security experts as a guideline into building 
security culture with their organisations. The framework comprises two fundamental 
components; awareness and training, see figure 13.  
 
The former component focuses on changing user’s behaviour (D'Arcy & Hovav 2007; 
Microsoft 2006) while the latter only focuses on creating new skills (Microsoft 2006). 
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The first component tells user what and how to meet organisation’s security standards 
and procedures while the second component teaches user with enough skills to deal 
with specific security problems. As noted by Microsoft, the initial point of the cycle is 




Figure 13: Information security learning lifecycle 
(Adapted from (Microsoft 2006)) 
 
Therefore, based on security learning cycle, knowledge capturing, storing and sharing 
of KM processes and repository and collaborative nature of KMS has been highlighted 
as appropriate features for improving security awareness within an organisational 
context. However, for the purpose of this dissertation, the description of KMS 
usefulness will focus only on security awareness. Knowledge capturing process is 
useful in articulating security issues from both knowledge seekers and providers while 
knowledge storing is useful for storing security knowledge contents. On the other hand, 
knowledge sharing facilitates searching and retrieving of knowledge content. 
Moreover, repository nature of KMS facilitates capturing, organising, and storing of 
knowledge content, while collaborative nature of KMS facilitates the actual knowledge 
sharing. 
 
From the literature review it was pointed out that user’ involvement, poor material 
preparation and delivery, ignorance of organisational and security culture are among 
the reasons to why current security awareness programme fail. Therefore, in solving 
these problems, a KMS framework will be developed to guide the development of 
KMS in improving security awareness. However, prior to framework development, the 
results from the survey will also considered on the development of the framework. 
Thereafter a Wiki-based KMS prototype will be developed to evaluate the contribution 
of KMS in improving security awareness in an organisational context. 
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In resolving all these, prior to the implementation of Wiki-based KMS prototype for 
security awareness, the framework considers computer security perceptions and 
security culture by including these as factors to determine the level of change 
management. It is the change management that focus on resolving the gap between 
executives, security experts and users by educating them the necessity of knowledge 
sharing and their contribution in corporate security. On the other hand, organisational 
culture is considered to resolve any conflicts with organisation interests so as to define 
appropriate type of KMS to facilitate security knowledge sharing between members of 
all levels.  
5.4 Conc lusion  
This chapter aimed at describing how KMS can be useful in improving security 
awareness. The second section provided the discussion of why security awareness is 
being perceived as a knowledge management problem. In this discussion 
organisational learning as identified in chapter four has been mapped with 
organisational security culture to allow the applicability of KMS. The discussion of 
organisational security culture was provided in section three where two security 
learning cycles were discussed.  
 
In this chapter, knowledge capturing, storing and sharing of knowledge management, 
and repository and collaborative features of KMS were identified as the key solution to 
the improvement of security awareness. The next chapter provides the description of 
security awareness survey emphasising on the roles users play in computer security 
and the effectiveness of current security awareness programmes in educating users. 
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6 SECURITY USER AWARENESS SURVEY 
6.1 Introduction  
Although much has been covered in the previous chapters about the research problem, 
obtaining industrial views is worthwhile. To achieve this an investigation was 
undertaken designed with the aim of investigating the roles users play in computer 
systems security and the effectiveness of current security user awareness programmes 
into educating users in security relevant issues. To achieve this both questionnaires and 
structured interviews were conducted and covered both end-users and security experts. 
 
This chapter describes the investigation undertaken, explaining the survey undertaken 
detailing its structure, respondents and mode of conduct and the results of interviews 
undertaken. A complete sample of survey will be provided in Appendix A. After data 
collection, the analysis of the results will be conducted. However, only the analysis of 
survey questions which have a direct impact on framework development will be 
conducted. An interview with security expert will be conducted to evaluate the 
findings obtained from the survey. This chapter concludes by identifying key findings 
as obtained from the survey. 
6.2 Audiences  
Since the survey aimed at understanding the roles users play in computer systems 
security and how different awareness programmes assists in educating users, therefore 
the targeted respondents included security experts and any computer specialists. 
However, since a security awareness programme aims at educating all employees in an 
organisation, end-users also were included. Security experts and computer specialists 
were preferred because of their broad knowledge while end-users were preferred 
because they are implicitly integrated in security learning cycle.  
 
Experts were thereafter categorised into two categories, academicians and industrial 
experts. Academicians include university lecturers in Information/Computer systems 
security modules, and researchers from different computer science research groups 
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while industrial experts include experts and consultants from security and information 
technology industry. University lecturers in computing department who teach modules 
other computer systems security were considered to be end-users so as to reduce the 
biasness of the results. Since the survey was about users’ involvement then we need 
input from them. We need to know their views about their involvement in security. 
6.3 Me thodology  
This survey was done in late June and majority of respondents were academicians with 
a very small portion of industrial experts. Therefore there were difficulties in 
physically reaching them since majority of them were out for vacation. This explains 
to why the questionnaire option was preferred. Although there were interviews over 
the phone, but these only targeted to a specific small number of security experts.  
 
The survey was based on two questionnaire approaches; offline and online surveying. 
The first approach was conducted into two phases; the first phase was through physical 
distribution of questionnaires during the 3rd ICITST seminar which was held on 23rd 
June 2008 at Dublin Institute of Technology. Moreover, the second phase was based 
on physical distribution of questionnaires to academicians and experts of different 
organisations in Tanzania.  
 
The second phase was done when the author was in a short break in Tanzania. Many 
questionnaires were distributed in different organisations. While in Tanzania, the 
author was tempted to extend the survey to Kenya and Uganda so as to get the feel of 
how developing countries perceive the issue of computer systems security. This 
extension was so potential in this project. The ICITST seminar was one of the potential 
samples for this survey because it involved experienced researchers and experts in 
computer science and security from different countries all over the world.  
 
The second approach of the survey was an online survey. This approach was both 
effective and convenient. It was effective in the sense that it broadens the accessibility 
of respondents, and convenient because it did not insist on immediate presence of the 
respondent. Respondent can find and fill in the questionnaire at their time. This 
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approach had three phases; creating respondents’ mailing list, online survey posting 
and last but not least, survey participation invitation.  
 
In the first phase, two different categories of mailing list were created. The first 
category was made from academic staff list and second from supporting staff list of 
institutions and universities of Ireland. After mailing list creation, the survey questions 
were posted online through an online survey tool, Group Surveys (http://beta.group-
surveys.com). This was a very useful tool, it allows respondent to fill in the 
questionnaire into phases and provides analysis capabilities. Through this tool, a 
respondent can partially fill in the questionnaire and proceed with it later. 
 
After posting the questions online, the last phase was invitation. The approach was to 
send email to the mailing list created during phase one of this approach by introducing 
the host of the survey, explaining its aim and purpose thereafter requesting the 
respondent’s participation in the completion of the survey. The link to the survey was 
included in the invitation e-mail allow the invitee to access the survey. However, to 
expand the number of respondents, mailing list from computer security relevant 
research groups were included. These included IS World and Security Focus discussion 
forums.  
6.4 Ques tionnaire  Des ign   
Imagine you are given a coffee machine without a user manual and/or being told its 
purpose. Will it be useful to you? The answer to this question is so obvious, it would 
not be of useful because you do not know what is it for and how to operate it. Likewise 
with surveys; without explaining its structure, it might lead to misjudgement of survey 
results. This section aims at explaining the structure of the survey by going into details 
of each question explaining why it was preferred and its contribution on the research 
problem.  
 
Although there were two versions of questionnaires for this survey, only the final 
structure will be explained since the only difference is the addition of questions. The 
analysis of the initial offline survey provided some interesting results which prompted 
the inclusion of additional questions in the second version to further the investigation 
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and strengthen the results. This section will not only introduce the reader with the 
structural understanding of the survey, but also acts as a guideline on how to 
effectively design and construct surveys.  
 
The first section of the survey aimed at understanding the respondents and the nature 
of their organisation. Different organisations have different needs of security measures. 
The need of security measures in agricultural and financial organisations is completely 
different. Moreover, the size of the organisation is also an essential parameter. The 
larger the size, the higher the accessibility of awareness programmes is required. The 
first two questions of this section were essential in determining the level of security 
measures and awareness programmes each organisation requires. 
  
The world is made up of different cultures. The level at which technology is being 
utilised in developed countries is quite different with those of third world countries. 
This subsequently affects the intensity of computer security. In developed countries, 
almost every operation is computerised, whereas in third world countries almost 
everything is manually processed. This concludes that to be effective in computer 
security, one should understand the culture of that organisation first. Questions 3 and 4 
of this section therefore aimed to ascertain the culture the respondent was from so that 
the impact this had on their answers could be investigated. 
  
Since this was an open survey, which means it was accessible to almost everyone who 
was either a member of intended discussion forum or mailing list, filtering was the 
only way to differentiate between experts and end-users. This was accomplished by 
question 5 and 6 which ascertained the respondents’ background. This approach was 
useful during the analysis phase where the results obtained from experts were extracted 
and analysed separately. It was essential to separate results from experts so as to 
increase the reliability of the survey results. Since security experts and end-users 
differs in computer security understandability therefore it was important to be able to 
identify the opinions of those experts who know about security while being able to 
identify issues which may be barriers to those who are trying to learn, the end-users. 
 
Further, question 7 and 8 aimed at further assessing the security qualifications of the 
respondent asking whether a respondent has any security professional qualification. 
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Professional qualifications are popular within the software industry. Certification 
programmes aim to provide an education in a set of issues where the achievement of a 
certification indicates that the holder is aware of these issues to a particular standard. It 
is therefore becoming increasingly popular. However, as was noted earlier, the need 
for security measures differs with the nature of organisations. In organisations A, the 
need for security professional qualification(s) might not be necessary but it might be a 
significant requirement for organisation B. So, it is necessary to determine the 
requirement of security professional qualification(s) so as to cover the need for 
including number of links for security professional bodies.  
 
Although in some organisations, security professional qualification(s) might be a 
significant requirement for security role, but might not be very useful in improving 
computer security. Moreover, even those organisations which security professional 
qualification(s) is not mandatory; it might happen some of security roles have security 
professional qualifications. The question arise, are they going to be recognised? This 
explains why question 9 and 10 were included in this survey; to test the usefulness of 
security professional qualifications in improving organisations’ computer security. 
  
Before rushing into designing of security awareness programme, one should assess the 
current computer security situation of that organisation. This can be done by 
determining the engagement of end-users in computer security and the effort that have 
been put forward by that organisation on maintaining its information resources. This 
was accomplished by questions that fall under section two of the survey. Question 1, 4, 
15, 16, 17 and 18 of this section focused on determining the effort of organisation in 
computer security whereas the remained questions focused on determining end-users 
engagement in computer security.  
 
Although, it is very common that every organisation must have security policies in 
place to educate users on their roles and standards of doing their tasks, in practice this 
is different. The initial survey experienced this problem because it the expectation was 
that that every organisation operating in today’s global environment would have 
security policies. However this proved not to be the case since in many cases, 
respondents most commonly in third world countries, ignored the question. This led to 
further investigation to find out why and it proved that it was not a valid to assume that 
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most organisations have some security policies. So an additional question was included 
in the online survey to determine whether the organisation has security policies or not 
so that the responses could be analysed differentiating between those respondents who 
worked in organisations with existing policies and those without. 
 
Apart from Systems Administrators, there are some roles in organisation that require 
computer systems’ administrative privileges to accomplish their tasks. Therefore, it is 
essential to determine what these roles are and whether they need special treatments in 
security awareness programme. Security policy alone would not be effective if this 
proved to be the case. Holders of such roles need to be educated on how to 
hygienically handle their privileges, like not to stay online where unnecessary and to 
avoid installation of applications without knowing their source. This explains why 
question 3 and 4 were included in the survey.  
 
As it was mentioned previously, security policy defines computer security 
requirements and security awareness programme(s) informs users about those 
requirements and provide them with necessary skills to accomplish them. Therefore, 
through security policy adherence, current organisation’s status of computer security 
and the successfulness of security awareness programme(s) can be determined. 
Question 15 and 16 attempted to determine this. 
 
Security policies do change. A policy might be useful today but might not be useful 
tomorrow. Therefore, evaluating users’ adherence alone it is not enough measurement 
for the success of information security. This emphasises the necessity of measuring the 
effectiveness of security policies. However, this contradicts with organisation’s 
rewarding schemes. In some organisation, information security is achieved not because 
of security policies but due to motivation of the individuals involved. Question 17 and 
18 attempted to ascertain information to allow these parameters to be explored. 
6.5 Survey  Results Analys is  
After completion of the survey, both offline and online, the process followed was 
survey data analysis. From the data obtained, many interest findings were discovered. 
This section describes the analysis process undertaken, presenting the results of the 
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survey and the analysis undertaken. Only results from questions that contribute to the 
development of the framework will be described.  
 
Although the structure of offline and online questionnaires differ, the online structure 
will be used as a guideline for the description of the analysis process. This section is 
divided into four phases; ICITST seminar’s analysis, Tanzanian’s analysis, Online 
analysis and combination of all surveys. Experts are expected to be more 
knowledgeable in the area. Conducting their results’ analysis separately could have 
much contribution to the framework development. To accomplish this, question 5 and 
6 of section 1 will be used.  
6.5.1  IC ITST Seminar  survey results  
In this survey, 30 copies of questionnaire were distributed during the registration 
session of the ICITST conference. Respondents were given freedom to complete the 
questionnaire at their convenience during the conference which lasted for four days. 
This survey was not so successful as compared to the one done in Tanzania. Until the 
final day of the seminar, only eight copies were returned which summed up to a total 
of 27%. However, since majority of attendants were security experts, the results 
obtained are still of valuable. 
 Respondents based on country 
From the analysis conducted based on question 3 of section 1, majority of respondents 
were from Ireland, United Kingdom and Jordan each with 25% respondent rate. Other 
countries include Netherlands and United States of America with 12.5% respondent 
rate. These respondents were very useful, not only because they are experts in the area, 
but also they represent developed countries that are more advanced in technology.  
 
   94
 
Figure 14:  Distribution of Respondent based on Country 
 
Although there were many categories of roles, all respondents opted for “Other IT 
Personnel” because there was no role for “Computer/IT Researcher”. However, their 
results were still valuable because majority of them are researchers in the field of 
computer and information security. This was the weakness that was encountered in the 
offline survey but it was fixed in the online survey by including the “Computer/IT 
Researcher” role category in the option. 
 Security awareness programme approaches 
The analysis of question 2 of section 3 reveals that majority of organisations with a 
total of 40% engage the use of email as their means of sharing information about 
security relevant issues. “Face-to-face” and “Presentation” approaches follow with 
20% less from “Email” approach. Other approaches include “Web-based” and “Poster” 
with 6.7% approaches.  
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Figure 15: Distribution of Awareness approaches 
 
However, this contradicts with an industrial opinion about the use of email as the way 
of communicating sensitive information (http://kmjeff.blogspot.com/). Apart from the 
fact that humans tends to ignore emails, especially from officemates, email tends to be 
so meshed up when there are many senders. When inbox is full it is difficulty to search 
through all the emails just to look for one particular email. Moreover, it is difficulty to 
track the progress of security awareness programme.  
 Breadth of awareness programme 
The analysis of question 3 and 4 of section 3 shows that majority of respondents do not 
know whether their security awareness programme goes beyond the awareness of 
security policies. Only 28.57% of respondents were confident about their security 
awareness programme did go beyond the awareness of policies. Interestingly, even an 
experienced respondent with 6 – 9 years range of experience, and CISM and CISSP 
security professional qualifications, opted for a “No” option.  
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Figure 16: Breadth of Security Awareness Programme 
 
This concludes that majority of organisations do not consider awareness programme(s) 
as the tool for educating users on computer security threats instead they consider it as 
the tool for informing users about organisational security policies. 
 
Summarising the findings from this analysis, majority of organisations considers email 
facility as effective means of communicating and sharing information concerning 
security requirements. Moreover, their perceptions on security awareness programme 
are limited to security policies and not as the tool for educating users about the trend of 
computer threats and how to combat against them. 
6.5.2  Tanzanian’s  survey resul ts  
In this survey 50 copies of questionnaires were distributed in education, government 
agencies, telecommunications and financial organisations. The survey lasted for one 
week from the distribution date. It was a very successful because out of 50 copies, 32 
copies of completed questionnaires were collected which accounted to 64% of the 
whole survey results. Only 3 copies of questionnaires were damaged due to concept 
misunderstood, hence total percentage of survey results remained to be 58%. 
 
However, the results obtained were quiet different with the results obtained in the 
previous analysis. The results revealed a huge gap of computer security perception 
between developed and developing countries. Therefore, the survey was extended to 
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include Kenya and Uganda to investigate how developing countries perceive the issue 
of information systems and computer security. Though it turned out their information 
security perception differs with developed countries, the results obtained contributed a 
lot in this project. It raised the issue of technological maturity to be thought when 
preparing awareness program which was not considered previously. 
 Information security roles and experience 
The analysis of question 5 and 6 reveals that majority of respondents fall under 1 to 5 
years category with a very little exception of 6 to 9 and 10 to 15 years categories. 
Moreover, majority of respondents opted for “Other IT Personnel” role category, with 
only six respondents on “Systems Administrator” role and one respondent on each of 
the remaining roles. However, this implies that majority of respondents were not 
necessarily experienced in computer security since “Other IT Personnel” might include 
any other roles like help desk, software developers, graphic designers and many alike. 
This is the same problem experienced in the previous survey. 
 
 
Figure 17: Respondents' experience based on role and qualification 
 
These results could be completely different if the question was to ask for specific 
computer security roles without including “Other IT Personnel” role category, or to ask 
the respondents if they were familiar with computer security prior to answering this 
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question. This indicates the deficiencies of this survey that need to be addressed when 
designing other survey of this nature. 
 
Nevertheless, an interesting finding can be obtained from the distribution of security 
professional qualifications. Although majority of respondents fall under “Other IT 
Personnel” category, only one respondent, who happened to be IT Security Supervisor, 
had security professional qualification. With remained two security professional 
qualifications to “IT Manager” and “CSO/CISO” categories. Moreover, only one 
respondent opted for “CSO/CISO” category with none in “CIO/CTO” category. This 
concludes that computer security in Tanzania has not yet been considered as an issue. 
 Users’ involvement with computer systems 
Moreover, analysis was done to determine the use of computer systems in Tanzania. 
Based on question 1 of section 1 and question 3 of section 2, it was discovered that 
majority of organisations involve their employees in using computer systems with 44% 
“High” and “Medium” categories . This can be graphically represented in figure 
below. However, this should not be confused with technological maturity of 
organisations. Majority of organisations in Tanzania are still operating manual. They 
use computers for office operations like report writing and very simple applications. 
 
 
Figure 18: Distribution of end-users in operating computer systems 
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Contrary, the results could be completely different if the question asked the number of 
operational information systems and/or their rate of connectivity to internet. Tanzania 
is still in automation level of technology. Based on an informal pilot survey, banking 
and telecommunications industry are termed to be the most successful in technology. 
However, there is no any transaction which are performed online except for balance 
enquires. These results have affinity with the results obtained by a telecommunications 
survey conducted by International Telecommunications Union (ITU 2007). Their 
result revealed that Africa has 2.5% internet subscribers compared to other continents 
such as Europe with 29%. 
 Applicable security awareness approaches 
The analysis of question 2 of section 3 shows that email, presentation and web-based 
are the common forms of awareness programmes with email as the highest with 43%. 
Thereafter it follows “Presentation” with 23% and the third approach is web-based 
with 20%. Other approaches include “Face-to-face” with 8%, “Posters” with 5% and 
3% without security awareness programme at all.  
 
 
Figure 19:  Distributions for security awareness approaches 
 
However, the results could be completely different if an option of “Not Applicable” 
was included. This is because the most common query posed by respondents was what 
was meant by security user awareness programme. This implies that majority of 
respondents chose “email”, “web-based” and “presentation” approaches because there 
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were common terms to them. Another interesting finding is the 3% of “none” option. 
This again emphasises the low maturity of information security in Tanzania. 
 Information security perception 
The analysis on question 1, 2 and 3 of section 1 against of that of question 1 of section 
2 reveals that the issue of computer security in Tanzania is very far behind hence many 
organisations does not take it as a serious issue. The results represented in the graph 





Figure 20: Distribution of Security Professional Qualifications in Organisations 
 
Only three respondents from government, education and telecommunication have 
security professional qualifications. Moreover, as it was shown in Figure 17, only one 
respondent have security role i.e. “CSO/CISO”. This concludes that many organisation 
in Tanzania they does not see the potential of information security.  
 
Findings obtained from this survey, triggered a pilot survey to other developing 
countries including Kenya and Uganda. These countries were picked because they are 
near to Tanzania and more importantly they present a clear picture of developing 
countries. Due to time limit, the approach employed was to contact key personnel in 
computing department of different organisation and ask general questions based on the 
results obtained from Tanzania. 
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Surprisingly, the answers received were very much in line with the results obtained 
from Tanzania. This again aroused curiosity for finding what reasons are behind this. 
Furthermore, another survey was conducted. The approach was to browse different 
universities’ web pages searching for modules that teach students on information 
systems security. The survey discovered that only few universities teach modules 
similar to information security. The majority of these courses are offered in training 
centres which is a bit expensive for an average person. 
6.5.3  Online  survey resu lts  
The aim of this project was to develop a framework that will leverage KMS to improve 
security awareness. It is clear from the aim that this framework is not a closed 
framework tightly to a specific country and/or organisation. Therefore all possible 
input must be considered prior to its designing. To accomplish this, the questionnaire 
was posted online so as to gain different views from different countries all over the 
world. The survey had large input to the project because many of the audience who 
responded are security researchers and experts from different countries. 
 
The survey lasted for three weeks period. 111 respondents responded to the survey and 
43 of questionnaires were fully completed with 22 respondents who did not replied at 
all. The survey was very successful because the response rate was very high with many 
countries which are regarded as benchmark for information security. Country like USA 
which is second high in the chart is far away in information security. Therefore from 
this huge number of response, useful information can be obtained.  
 Respondents by country 
The analysis of respondent based on countries as shown in Figure 21, the top three 
countries are Tanzania with 22.6% followed by United States of America with 20.2% 
and 14.3% for United Kingdom. Other countries which are in top five include Ireland 
with 13.1%, and Malaysia and Singapore with 3.6%. The remaining countries which 
also participated in the survey include Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela, Indonesia, 
Iceland, Pakistan, France, India, Singapore, Mexico and Romania, Germany, Nigeria, 
China, Hong Kong, Canada and Portugal. 
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Figure 21: Respondents by country 
 
As shown in the chart, many countries participated in the survey. This shows the 
reliability of the results and hence provides good inputs for the design of the 
framework which is the objective of this project. Besides the reliability of the results, 
the survey also proves to be interesting to win such a huge number of respondents in a 
very short period.  
 Users’ involvement 
The analysis of question 2 of section 2 reveals that majority of organisation ignores 
users’ involvement in establishing security policies. As shown in Figure 22, majority 
of respondents agreed opted for “Medium” category with 26.8% then followed by 
24.4% of “Very low”. On the other hand, only few of respondents opted for “Very 
high” and “High” categories with only 4.9% while others opted for “Low”, “Very low” 
and “Don’t know” categories with 17.1%, 14.6% and 7.3% respectively. Statistically, 
only 36.6% of respondents consider users’ involvement in establishing security 
policies. Therefore, 65.4% of respondents they either take it for granted or do not 
consider it at all. 
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Figure 22: Users' Involvement in Policy Establishment 
 Security adherence 
Users’ involvement in security policy establishment is directly proportional to their 
adherence. As the shown in Figure 23 the values for users’ involvement during security 
policy establishment is directly proportional to the values for security policy 
adherence. Therefore, this emphasises that users’ involvement in security policy 
establishment determines their adherence with security policies. 
 
Figure 23: Relationship between users' involvement and policy adherence 
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6.5.4  General  survey resul ts  
The previous analysis focused on analysis of individual surveys. However, since the 
aim of the survey was to investigate the roles users play in computer security and the 
effect of security awareness programme in educating users, it is now plausible to 
combine the results from each survey and analyse so as to gain the general results. 
 Poor user involvement in security decisions 
As previously results revealed, user involvement in security relevant decisions is very 
poor. The analysis was done based on the question asking if the respondent’s 
organisation considers users in establishing security policies. As shown in figure 24, 
majority of respondent are between “Medium” and “Low” categories, with only total 
of 8% of “High” categories. On the other hand, as shown on graph (b), users’ 
involvement is directly proportion to their adherence with security policies. This 
concludes that majority of organisations involved in the survey does not consider 
users’ participation in security related decisions and thus it has impact on the 
successful of organisational computer security. 
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Figure 24: User involvement in security decisions 
 Computer security perception 
Comparison of survey results from Tanzania and those collected from ICITST revealed 
the difference in computer security perceptions between developing and developed 
countries. The results revealed that Tanzania which represents developing countries is 
very poor in understanding computer security. As it is shown in figure 25, the 
comparison of security qualifications, roles and government involvement between 
developing and developed countries revealed there is a gap of 1:3 ratios in computer 
security. The results show the respondents from developing countries have only 4 
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security qualifications out of 48 respondents, inclusive 19 respondents from online 
survey. On the other hand, developed countries have 12 security qualifications out of 
65. Moreover, comparison of government involvement in security issues reveals the 
gap between developing and developed countries. As shown in figure 25, government 
involvement in computer security is poor compared with developing countries.  
 
Figure 25: The gap of computer security between developed and developing countries 
 
Moreover, based on the question that was asking respondents about whether there is 
security awareness programme in their organisations, results confirm the gap between 
developed and developing countries. The gap between “Yes” from respondents from 
developed countries is twice as the response from developing countries. Moreover, the 
number of respondents who did not know whether there is security awareness 
programme in place is high for developing counties compared to developed countries.  
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 Email as a major tool 
Both the results from all surveys show that email is a leading approach for security 
awareness programme.  As shown in the figure 26, for general results email is the 
leading approach followed by web-based which is 8.09% less than email approach. 
 
Figure 26: Distribution of security awareness approaches 
 Narrowness of security awareness programme(s) 
The analysis was done based on the question asking whether security awareness 
programme(s) goes beyond the awareness of security policies. As it can be seen from 
the diagram 27, majority of respondents opted for “Yes” with 49.18% followed by 
“No” option with 36.07% and finally with “Don’t know” with 15%. However, thought 
the results shows majority of organisations consider awareness programmes to go 
further, but in totality the result is poor because it is only 49.18% of the whole results. 
This concludes that security awareness has not yet been seriously practiced. 
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Figure 27: Breadth of Awareness Programmes 
6.6 Supporting  interv iews  
6.6.1  In terview  design  
The aim of this survey was to investigate the roles users play in computer security and 
the effort of the current security awareness programme into educating users in security 
related issues. The survey was successful with reasonable number of participants 
whom majority were security experts. Many findings were obtained. However, since 
these are the inputs for the development of the framework, therefore it is plausible to 
evaluate them prior to their applicability. Therefore, the primary aim of these 
interviews was to evaluate findings as obtained from both literature review and the 
survey as well.  
 
The questions of the interview were derived from findings both from literature review 
and survey. Six questions were derived, each covered findings from both literature 
review and survey. A complete structure of interview is provided in appendix B. The 
interview questions were then tested for completion time by imitating the interview 
session with colleague. The resulted completion time was 45 minutes.  
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6.6.2  In terviewee  contributions  
 1st Interviewee 
The interview was conducted on August 25th 2008 with a former security expert in 
computer security which lasted for one hour. To be in the same line with interview 
questions, the interview began with briefly explanation of the project aim. Thereafter, 
the interviewee initiated a general discussion of the structure of the interview questions 
where some comments were noted. After a general discussion of interview questions, 
the main theme of the discussion was initiated where the interviewee commented in a 
number of things both general for the dissertation and specific for interview session. 
 
The initial comments which were noted were based on the look and feel of interview 
questions. Among these comments was the generic nature of the interview questions. 
The interviewee commented that the questions are too general and they should focus 
on specific issue. For instance in question one, the interviewee noted that the question 
did not state what type of users the question is focusing on. Furthermore, the 
interviewee commented on the clarity of the questions and suggested for inclusion of 
examples to give a clear picture of questions. For instance in question 1 and 2, 
interviewee suggested including examples of policy and topic of material respectively. 
 
Following the interview theme, in question 1 and 2, interviewee agreed with argument 
but with exceptions that only the management and/or IT personnel who participate in 
policy making and/or security awareness building process, respectively, should be the 
last decision makers. The interviewee commented that there are negotiatable and non-
negotiatable security policies. For non-negotiatable security policies users must be told 
and follow while negotiatable users can discuss about the establishment of the policy.  
 
However, in Knowledge Management context the author believe that regardless of the 
nature of the policy, employees’ engagement in establishing security policies is 
essential for its success. This is because employees will feel a sense of being respected 
and not just dragged like machine. This will make the employees to have trust with 
their management and thus motivates them on opening up for new idea.  
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“Engagement communicates management’s respect for individuals and their ideas.” 
(Kim & Mauborgne 2003) 
 
Proceeding with the interview, in question 3 and 5 the interviewee also agreed with the 
argument that both organisational culture and security culture are crucial factors to be 
considered. However, the interviewee argued that these cultural factors go head-to-
head with domain of the organisation. Therefore, a clear understanding of the domain 
determines the cultural behaviours of the organisation. This comment was inline with 
author’s view. 
 
In the general comments of the dissertation, interviewee commented on the clarity of 
the dissertation where further emphasises were on the scope and relevance of literature 
review and definitions of factors.  
6.7 Summary  of  findings  
6.7.1  Poor  user  involvement  in  security decisions  
The analysis shows, see figure 24, that users involvement in security policy 
establishment is poor and thus it has direct impact on users’ adherence with security 
policies. Therefore, this reveals that if users could be involved in security related 
decisions, security policy compliance could increase and hence increase in computer 
security in general.   
6.7.2  Computer  security perceptions  
The analysis of the results from both surveys reveals a gap of computer security 
perception between developing and developed countries, see figure 25. This is 
apparently because of differences technological infrastructure maturity. Unlike in 
developed countries, majority of organisations in developing countries are still 
operating manually (Bugada 2005).  Therefore, this will subsequently reduce computer 
threats and hence its consciousness. 
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6.7.3  E-mail  as  a  major  security awareness  approach 
The survey reveals that e-mail has dominate as a major channel for disseminating 
security awareness materials with a little exception on web-based approach, see figure 
26. This explains why majority of security awareness programme fails. This is because 
email is not a convenient tool for facilitating collaboration. 
6.7.4  Narrowness  of  awareness  programme(s) 
The survey results reveals that majority of organisations does not consider awareness 
as a broad means of educating their employees on security issues more than security 
policies, see figure 27. This explains why the number of security break-ins increases. 
6.8 Conc lusion  
This chapter aimed at describing security awareness survey. In section two, 
explanation of survey audiences was conducted which included both security experts 
and end-users. The survey was based on both online and physical distribution of 
questionnaires. In physical distribution, questionnaires were distributed in ICITST 
seminar which was held in Dublin Institute of Technology and in Tanzania. The results 
obtained from questionnaires distributed in Tanzania triggered the extension of the 
survey to other developing countries including Kenya and Uganda.  
 
The description of survey designing was conducted in section four where the aim of 
each question was explained. The analysis of survey results was conducted in section 
five where each survey was separately analysed and finally combined. Among the 
findings of the survey is the gap of security perception between developed and 
developing countries. Other findings include poor users’ involvement, dominance of e-
mail in security awareness, and the shallowness of security awareness programmes. 
The following chapter describes the development of a framework and prototype 
implementation. 
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7 KMS-SAWA FRAMEWORK AND PROTOTYPE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
7.1 Introduction  
All the way from chapter 2 of this dissertation to chapter 5, the research presented has 
been focused on establishing the foundations for the heart of the project described in 
this dissertation which is to investigate how KMS could be useful in improving 
security awareness in an organisation context. From the research documented in 
previous chapters, a framework to use KMS to improve security awareness has been 
developed that leverages the findings obtained.  This chapter discusses the 
development of this framework.  
 
The chapter starts by discussing key factors which were found to influence the creation 
of a KMS to support security awareness. Further the chapter extends the findings not 
just to the development of a KMS but to the development of a security awareness 
programme in any form. The chapter discusses the iterative development of KMS-
SAWA framework. The chapter then moves on to discuss the implementation of a 
prototype KMS for security awareness using Wiki technology and concludes by 
presenting the evaluation of this prototype and drawing conclusions on the overall 
usefulness of the premise of the project described in this dissertation . 
7.2 Factors  for   KMS implementation  for  security  awareness  
In this dissertation the determination of organisation’s technological maturity, security 
culture, and organisational culture have been identified as crucial factors for successful 
implementation of KMS for security awareness programme. This section focuses on 
discussing each of these factors by going into details on determining the criterion for 
their categorisation. 
7.2 .1  Technological  matur ity 
From the findings obtained from the survey results, it is clear that technological 
maturity of an organisation determines the consciousness of computer security. 
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Technological maturity defines the advancement in computer technology in an 
organisation or any area where it is applicable. The survey results revealed the gap of 
computer security perceptions between developed and developing countries. 
Therefore, since the framework is an open framework, it is plausible to determine the 
technological maturity of the organisation prior to building process of security 
awareness programme.  
 
Most of previous approaches overlooked the necessity of determining the 
technological advancement of an organisation with the assumption that all 
organisations are well established in technology. However, this is not the picture of 
third world countries. As it was noted previously, in third world countries, computers 
are mainly used for office operations with limited internet access for communications 
purposes. Although there are few organisations such as financial institutes, government 
and telecommunications which are said to be advanced in technology, but still many of 
their tasks are manual carried.  
 
However the challenge remains on how to determine organisation’s technological 
maturity level. Fortunately, this process can be carried out just like requirements 
analysis phase of software development life cycle. Therefore, normal techniques for 
data collection, such as interview, observation, survey and many alike, can be applied 
in this phase and come up with useful information. However, the problem still persists, 
after obtaining for instance the number of applications that are operational and their 
categories, how can someone categorise between high and low technological 
maturities?  
 
By itself, developing a criterion for determining the level of technological maturity in 
organisations is enough title for the MSc. Dissertation. It requires an extensive 
research on how different organisations perceive the potentiality of computer 
applications in hand and how should they categorise applications based on their 
usability. Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation this issue will be ignored and 
considered as a future work for this project. 
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7.2 .2  Organisational  secur ity culture  
Understanding the level of technological maturity provides a clear picture of computer 
security perceptions of an organisation. However, the analysis of organisational 
security culture is crucial prior to the implementation of KMS for security awareness 
programme. Organisational security culture defines organisation’s initiatives toward 
computer security. These initiatives include encouragement of security collaboration 
events, motivation schemes for practicing good security principles and users’ 
engagement in security related decisions. The survey results shows majority of security 
awareness programmes fail because they ignore the cultural component. It is illusion to 
deal with human elements without considering their intuitions. 
 
However, the challenge here is not on how to measure the level of security culture 
within organisation, the challenge is on how to measure their successfulness. What is 
interested in this factor is on how current security initiatives help in minimising 
computer threats and not how many initiatives are currently running. It is possible to 
have many security initiatives but with poor results in computer security, which is the 
focal point for their existence. Therefore it is crucial to determine how effective these 
initiatives are prior to building awareness programme.  
 
The level of organisational security culture can be measured by quantifying current 
security initiatives of the organisation. Contrary, the effectiveness of security culture 
can be measured by the number of computer security break-ins before and after the 
initiation of the initiative. The decrease of computer security break-ins indicates the 
successfulness of security culture and vice-versa. Therefore, the higher the decrease 
rate of security break-ins the higher successful of initiatives so is the higher the level of 
security culture and vice versa. 
7.2 .3  Organisational  culture  
The organisation’s technological maturity level and organisational security culture 
determines the level of implementing security awareness programme. However, 
explanation of the level of security awareness programme implementation is beyond 
the scope of this section. This section only focuses on the description of organisational 
culture in successful implementation of KMS for security awareness programme. This 
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factor is in line with the first phase of building security awareness programme as 
explained in chapter 3. In this context, organisational culture defined by the rules, 
procedures, standards, values and mode of conduct of organisation’s operations.  
 
As it was explained in chapter 4, understanding the nature of organisation is crucial in 
determining the type of KMS to be implemented within the organisation. The 
production type of an organisation with its market flexibility determines the type of 
KMS to be implemented. Moreover, Desman (2002, pp.19-25) emphasises on 
understanding the means of communications that are appropriate and applicable for 
both the management and subordinates within the organisation. Therefore, all these 
emphasise the necessity of understanding the culture that drives an organisation. 
However, this is not about measuring its effectiveness or contributions in computer 
security. This factor is for determining the “do’s” and “don’ts” of organisation. 
Therefore, for determining the type of KMS to be deployed to a specific organisation, 
a product-service model as described in chapter 4 will be used. 
7.3 Initial  KMS-SAWA  framework  
As mentioned previously, for an organisation to successfully leverage KMS to improve 
security awareness programme it needs to fulfil three factors; technological maturity, 
organisational security culture and organisational culture. Technological maturity 
factor determines the level of computer security perception whereas organisational 
security culture determines the initiatives for computer security improvement. 
Organisational culture determines the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the organisation.  
 
The first two factors, technological maturity and security culture, acts as active factors 
where they must be fulfilled for organisation to initiate security awareness 
implementation process. Depending on their fulfilment, these factors determine the 
implementation level of security awareness programme. On the other hand, the final 
factor which is organisational culture determines the type of KMS to be implemented 
for disseminating security related materials. However, since the framework will be 
practically used, it was worthwhile to be evaluated by security experts (evaluator).  
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Therefore, this section focuses on describing the evaluation process of the framework. 
However, it should be noted this evaluation is just an initial evaluation focusing only 
on the framework readability and applicability to the organisational context. Another 
evaluation which will focus on usability of the framework will be explained in section 
7.5. This evaluation session was based on oral interview where the author met face-to-
face with evaluator. The session started by briefly explanation of the framework and 





Figure 28: Initial KMS-SAWA Framework 
 
 
As shown in figure 28, the framework, as notified by evaluator, lacks the correlation 
between the implementation phases. That is, there is no a clear cut point showing the 
incremental implementation if the organisation falls under the 1st phase of 
implementation. Moreover, evaluator pointed out that there is no clarity on the scope 
of pilot security awareness programme. Evaluator also pointed out that the framework 
does not show the exemption of 3rd phase on pilot security awareness programme. 
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Furthermore, the framework does not show the third factor to be considered for the 
implementation of KMS for security awareness. Finally, the evaluator argued on the 
complexity of categorising cultural issue within organisations. Therefore, the evaluator 
suggested for reduction of organisational security culture into high and low categories. 
 
On session adjourning, the evaluator commented on the applicability of the framework 
in an organisational context with the conditions to amend all the deficiencies that were 
identified during the session. All these comments were then worked on and are 
reflected in the new framework, see figure 29. 
7.4 KMS-SAWA framework  descriptions  
As mentioned previously, pre-evaluation of KMS-SAWA framework focused on 
readability and applicability of the framework. Based on the comments from the 
evaluator, new framework was developed to accommodate all comments. Therefore 
the whole of this section will focus on describing the KMS for Security Awareness 
(KMS-SAWA) framework, see figure 28.  
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Figure 29: KMS - SAWA Framework 
 
As it can be shown in figure 29, the framework has two layers of security awareness 
programme(s); middle layer which is pilot security awareness programme and upper 
layer which is the actual implementation of security awareness programme. Pilot 
security awareness programme is a temporary strategy to ensure security awareness 
within an organisation while it is in a transition period. However, this is with 
exceptional for 3rd phase of implementation which goes directly to initiate the 
permanent implementation of KMS for security awareness.  
 
Moreover, depending on the implementation phase, organisations might require to 
initiate a change management programme to introduce security culture prior to actual 
implementation of security awareness programme (Alavi & Leidner 1999). Again 
depending on implementation phase, this change management may target either both 
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user categories; end-users, IT personnel and Managers, or only end-users and technical 
staff. Much detail on change management programme will be discussed in section 
7.4.1 and 7.4.2. 
 
The approach used to describe the KMS-SAWA framework is based on its 
implementation phases. Therefore, the 1st phase of implementation will be discussed 
followed by 2nd phase then finalise with the 3rd phase. All components of the 
framework, starting from bottom up, will be implicitly described in the descriptions of 
each phase. However, it should be noted that the order of implementation phases is not 
rigid. Depending on the levels of technological maturity and security culture of the 
organisation, any phase can be implemented first. 
7.4.1  1 s t  Phase  of  implementation  
As it is shown from the framework, figure 29, organisations that have low 
technological maturity level fall under the first phase of implementation. As referred 
from the survey findings, the level of technology has impact on computer security 
perception and computer security in general. Therefore, building on this finding, 
organisations that have low technological maturity are subsequently poor in security 
culture. As it can be shown on the framework, organisations that fall in this category 
must initiate a change management programme that aims at preparing end-users, IT 
personnel and executives prior to the implementation of KMS for security awareness. 
The aim of this change management is to educate them the benefits of computer 
security and security culture as well so as in return they can be the champions into 
engineering its adoption within the organisation. 
  
Meanwhile a pilot security awareness programme must be initiated to temporarily 
accommodate the needs in hand. This is the first form of security awareness 
programme. Security awareness programme in this phase is in its simplest form that 
focuses mainly on temporarily disseminating security related issues within the 
organisation. However, if organisation in this phase chooses to concentrate with 
managerial change management and ignore the other bit, then it will always remain in 
phase one unless it changes its status of technological maturity. Therefore, for 
organisation in this phase to implement KMS for security awareness must overcome 
   120
phase 1 which is basically concerns with managers’ change management and thereafter 
to undergo users’ and IT personnel change management.  
 
Moreover, organisations that fall into a medium class of technological maturity, they 
will then be tested for the level of security culture. If the organisations fall in the low 
class of security culture, they will again fall into the first phase of implementation. 
However, the difference from the previous first phase is that for this phase change 
management programme is not as intense as the previous one. In this it is assumed that 
managers have insights on why computer security is essential for their business. 
7.4.2  2nd  Phase  of  implementation  
The previous phase of KMS implementation focused on change management for both 
users and IT personnel, and managers. In the second phase of implementation, the 
focus is the change management for users and IT personnel. Therefore, organisations 
that has medium technological maturity level and high level of security culture falls 
under this phase. Meanwhile, the pilot security awareness programme needs to be 
implemented to temporarily handle the current situation of disseminating security 
related issues.  
 
In this phase, a change management programme focuses on users and IT personnel. As 
it was discovered from the literature review, the gap between users and security 
personnel has impact on the successfulness of security awareness programme and 
computer security as well. Therefore, the aim of this change management programme 
is to resolve this gap that exists between security experts and users by explaining to 
them the importance of knowledge sharing and their impact in security of corporate 
information assets. Again this phase must fulfil the requirements of this phase prior to 
actual implementation of KMS for security awareness programme.  
 
Moreover, all organisations that have high technological maturity level but medium 
security culture fall in this phase. However, change management in this is not as 
intense as the previous category. In this, it is assumes that the gap between end-users 
and security personnel is small and hence slight effort is required resolve the gap.  
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7.4.3  3 rd  Phase  of  implementation  
If organisation has fulfilled all the requirements of phase one and two of 
implementation then it enters into the third phase. In this phase, the actual 
implementation of KMS for security awareness is initiated. As it was discovered in the 
literature review, organisational culture is a central for the successful of security 
awareness programme. Therefore, in line with this finding, prior to the implementation 
of KMS for security awareness, organisational culture is considered in this framework. 
Unlike technological maturity and security cultural factors, organisational culture is for 
determination of the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the organisation. Therefore, after analysing 
cultural element of an organisation, normal process of building security awareness 
programme, as described in section 3.4, follows in the context of KMS. 
 
Meanwhile, for organisation that has not pass through phase one and two, it will be 
tested for its technological maturity level. If the organisation fell in a high class it will 
then be tested for the level of security culture. Again if the level of security culture is 
high, then the organisation is declared to be mature enough to initiate the actual 
implementation of KMS for security awareness programme. Therefore, this level skips 
the change management phase and pilot security awareness.  
7.4.4  Summary of  why KMS-SAWA  framework  is  a  solution  
This framework is useful in implementing KMS for implementing security awareness 
programme because it addresses all previously identified problems for the failure of 
successfulness of current security awareness programmes. From the literature review it 
was pointed out that user’ involvement, poor material preparation and delivery, 
ignorance of organisational and security culture are among the reasons to why current 
security awareness programme fail. Moreover, survey findings also emphasised on 
users’ involvement and consideration of computer security perceptions.  
 
In resolving all these, the KMS-SAWA framework considers computer security 
perceptions and security culture by including these as factors to determine the level of 
change management. It is this change management that focus on resolving the gap 
between users and security personnel. Therefore, by resolving this gap users’ 
involvement will definitely be increased and hence improves security awareness 
   122
material preparations. Moreover, organisational culture is considered to resolve any 
conflicts with organisation interests so as to define appropriate type of KMS to 
facilitate security knowledge sharing between members of all levels. Therefore, by 
deciding on the appropriate KMS for disseminating security awareness material, 
greater response from users from all levels of management will be attracted.  
7.5 Prototype  implementation  
As it was described in KMS-SAWA framework, for a successful implementation of 
KMS on security awareness context, three phases of implementation must be 
accomplished. However, this only depends on the level of technological maturity and 
security culture of the organisation. Moreover, organisation type and the number of 
users also determine the nature of KMS to be implemented for that particular 
organisation.  
 
This prototype was implemented to operate within any education institution with the 
main concentration to lecturers as users. For the purpose of demonstration, this 
prototype concentrated with the final phase of implementation with the assumption 
that the underlying organisation is stable both in technology and security culture. 
Therefore, effort is on disseminating security relevant material. Furthermore, due to 
time limit and complexity nature of material preparation, the prototype was 
specifically concentrating on educating users on phishing attacks. 
 
The topic was chosen because it is the hot topic in security arena and mostly 
susceptible to users (Sheng et al. 2007; Robila & Ragucci 2006). The type of KMS to 
be implemented was determined based on the approach described in section 4.5.2. The 
approach shows that all education institutions fall under “Service-based low volatile” 
category (Kankanhalli et al. 2003). This implies that the nature of KMS to be 
implemented for that particular category must be a hybrid of collaborative tools and 
repositories. 
 
Collaborative tools enable knowledge providers to share their understanding on 
computer threats with knowledge seekers (Markus 2001). Moreover, repositories 
enable knowledge intermediary to structure and store knowledge provided into useful 
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format for future use. However, for the case of this prototype, users play dual roles; 
both seekers and providers. They are seekers because they need to be aware on current 
phishing techniques and how to deal with them.  
 
Moreover, they are also knowledge providers because they direct computer security 
personnel what need to be included in awareness materials. However, this is done 
indirectly by letting users to rank the topics based on their importance. Therefore, from 
the rank, computer security personnel will be able to understand users’ needs and tailor 
the learning material to the needs. This approach not only attracts many users but also 
improves material relevance and hence successfulness of security awareness 
programme(s). 
 
On the other side, computer security personnel play threefold roles; provider, seeker 
and intermediary (Markus 2001). They are knowledge providers because they initiate 
the learning process by providing users with knowledge of how to protect against 
phishing attacks.  Moreover, they also play as intermediaries because they are 
responsible for codification of their knowledge.  Also they are knowledge seekers 
because they are dependant on users to shape learning materials.  
 
The prototype was implemented using an online free powerful Wiki tool, http://kms-
sawa.wetpaint.com. Most importantly, it has two unique features that were found to be 
very useful to the implementation of this prototype; private accessibility and tracking 
of changes. The tool enables a creation of a private account that can only be accessible 
to the invited members. This resolved the risk of intruders gaining access as mentioned 
in the proposal. Moreover it tracks every changes made on pages thus it is useful for 
monitoring progress of the system.  
7.5.1  Proto type  descript ions  
As it was mentioned previously, this type of prototype is a collaborative KMS to assist 
knowledge providers, seekers and intermediaries into capturing and sharing security 
related knowledge. In this KMS there were two actors, members/users who were 
academic staff and security administrator who was author, under a supervision of 
security expert. Awareness materials were limited on phishing attacks because of time 
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limit and complexity nature of preparation. As it was mentioned previously, 
knowledge capturing, storing and sharing of knowledge management processes, and 
collaborative and repositories features of KMS are useful features for the success of 
KMS in improving security awareness. Therefore, this section focuses on describing 
SAWA-KMS prototype as a KMS system for improving security awareness in an 
organisation based on knowledge storing and sharing. 
 Knowledge capturing and storing   
As it was explained previously, knowledge capturing concentrates on knowledge 
articulation and codification while knowledge storing concentrates with managing 
knowledge content. In this prototype knowledge capturing takes two forms. Firstly, is 
the direct codification of tacit knowledge from security administrator and codification 
of explicit knowledge from other sources such as public awareness websites and other 
security forums. Secondly and lastly, capturing of ongoing discussions to determine 
and prepare security awareness material.  
 
Capturing tools provided by this prototype is EasyEdit and Attachment capabilities as 
shown in figure 29. EasyEdit allows member of the community to edit the page and 
add the contents, as shown in figure 30, while Add attachment as shown on the drop 
down list of figure 29 allows both a member and administrator to attach files for others 
to share.  
 
 
Figure 30: Knowledge capturing: Attachments 
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com)) 
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Moreover, the prototype provides tagging feature that are useful in organising 
knowledge contents, see figure 29. For instance in page1 you have included phishing, 
email scam and identity theft as tags, and in page 2 you have included one of the 
previous keywords as the tag, when you open either of the pages it the prototype will 
include the link for the other page. Tags also help when searching for documents. You 
just need to know the keyword. This is in fact a very useful feature of knowledge 
storing because it reduce the time members searches for documents. 
 
 
Figure 31: SAWA-KMS Phishing attacks page 
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com)) 
 
 Knowledge sharing 
Other useful process of knowledge management that was highlighted as useful in using 
KMS to improve security awareness is knowledge sharing. In this process, knowledge 
sharing is accomplished by discussion forum facility of the prototype, see figure 32. 
This facility collaborate members to share different views concerning computer 
security. The good part of it, which differentiates it from email, is the track-keeping of 
all previous discussions. It shows who edited the discussion and when it was edited 
and what contents has been edited. All these are presented in one window called 
“Dashboard”. 
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Figure 32: SAWA-KMS threads dashboard 
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com)) 
 
Alavi and Leidner (1999) ascertain that learning is a process of internalising and 
converting information to knowledge. Therefore, besides the richness of knowledge 
content, members’ awareness on the content is fundamental to speed up the learning 
process. Having noticed this illness, the prototype deploys the push-pull strategy to 
notify members by automatically sending an email about new “arrival” so that they 
can retrieve at their convenient (Nonaka 2005, p.188).  
 
Based on all these features and the considerations taken during its implementation 
process, this prototype can definitely assisting in security knowledge sharing and 
hence improve security awareness in an organisation. 
7.5.2  Proto type  test ing  
Now that we know what the prototype is capable of, let us now analyse its applicability 
in industry. As it was explained previously, the prototype has two actors; security 
administrator and members. Security administrator for initiating and updating security 
knowledge content and members for participating in security based discussions. The 
testing of this prototype was done in two phases. Phase one was during the 
implementation and in phase two is after the implementation. 
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 Testing during prototype  implementation 
This was ongoing testing where a number of security experts were invited with 
administrative privileges of the prototype to monitor on the look and feel of security 
materials. This included what should be included in what extent under what title. This 
was a very effective way of presenting security content of the site to make members 
finds what they expect and hence increase its usability. 
 Operational testing 
This is the testing after completion of prototype implementation. In this phase 
members were invited to participate in the prototype. A copy of invitation can be found 
in appendix C. These members were specifically academicians from Africa so as to get 
a clear feeling on the contribution of the prototype to their knowledge since Africa 
symbolises developing countries which are very poor in computer security (ITU 2007).   
7.6 Evaluation  
Due to poor accessibility of internet services, users’ response was very poor. This can 
evidently shown by the fluctuation shape of the activity diagram as shown in figure 34. 
However, regardless the poorness of members’ accessibility, there are total number of 
seven knowledge sharing events, see figure 33. This implies that, with time the 
prototype could be more interactive and increase more knowledge sharing.  
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Figure 33: Current Discussions 
(Adapted from (http://kms-sawa.wetpaint.com)) 
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Figure 34: Activity graph 
(Adapted from (https://www.google.com/analytics/)) 
7.7 Conc lusion  
This chapter aimed at describing the development of a KMS-SAWA framework and 
the implementation of a Wiki-based prototype. The framework is made up with three 
factors based on the findings obtained from literature review and security awareness 
survey. The explanation of these factors was provided in section two. The initial 
framework was described in section three which was evaluated by security expert to 
assess its readability and applicability. The evaluation was interview-based. Following 
the recommendations from security expert, a complete framework was developed. The 
description of a complete framework was provided in section four where difference 
phases of KMS implementation were explained.  
 
In section five, the description of Wiki-based prototype was provided. The description 
of the prototype was based on knowledge capturing, storing and sharing processes of 
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knowledge management as identified in chapter five. The EasyEdit and attachment 
facilities of Wiki have been identified to facilitate knowledge capturing. Moreover, the 
discussion forums and threads have been identified to facilitate knowledge sharing. 
Both security experts and users were invited to test and evaluate the prototype. The 
evaluation of the prototype was provided in section six. The following chapter 
provides the summary of the project and identifying and the recommendation of future 
work. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction  
Since now we are approaching to end of this dissertation, it is worthwhile having a 
quick grasp of what was done up to this end. This chapter will detail the results, 
conclusions and recommendations reached from the research conducted. The aim of 
this project was investigate users’ awareness in security issues and the usefulness of 
KMS in improving security user awareness thereafter to develop a framework that 
leverages KMS in improving security awareness in an organisational context. From 
this framework a prototype KMS was developed. This chapter will discuss the major 
results of this project and also recommend future research needed to give a more 
comprehensive overview of the issues addressed and findings of the project discussed 
in this dissertation. 
8.2 Research Definition & Research Overview  
Security awareness is the key issue in the prosperity of organisations. Organisations 
are heavily reliant on users for their operations and yet users are becoming more 
susceptible to threat over time.  Though there are many technological control 
measures, users’ co-operation is still of particular value. Organisations need to 
seriously address human issues in security by building security learning environments 
that will integrate security ethics in their daily operations. 
 
The aim of the project was to investigate users’ awareness of computer security issues 
and the feasibility of employing a KMS to improve security awareness in an 
organisational context.  Thereafter the aim was to develop a framework that leverages 
KMS to improve security awareness in an organisational context.  Finally this project 
developed a Wiki-based KMS prototype based on the framework developed, which 
was evaluated by both security experts and end-users with the security experts guiding 
the development of the prototype while end-users were involved in evaluating the 
prototype assessing the contribution of the KMS to improving their security 
knowledge. 
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8.3 Contributions to the Body  of  Knowledge  
Firstly and foremost the role of users in security and security awareness was identified 
as the main research area of this project. The motive behind this is the increased rate of 
security break-ins due to poor understanding of security standards. Following this, 
KMS was identified as a possible solution to improve security awareness. The motive 
behind choosing KMS is their success in improving organisation’s performance in 
other knowledge areas. 
 
In order to accomplish this, an extensive literature review on security and security 
awareness area was undertaken to ascertain current key issues in an organisational 
context. An extensive exploration of computer security was covered where the trend of 
security threats and their control measures related to users were explored. Further, an 
investigation of security awareness was conducted where different security awareness 
approaches were explored. Although users’ involvement in security is an active 
research area, the literature reveals that little effort has been invested in implementing 
effective security awareness programmes to combat the problem. 
 
Using the findings from the literature review, a survey was prepared targeting security 
experts and organisational users, particularly academic users in Africa. The aim of the 
survey was to investigate the role users’ play in computer security and the 
contributions of current security awareness programmes in educating users. The survey 
revealed both poor user involvement and limitations in use of security awareness 
programmes. Moreover, the survey revealed the gap of security perceptions in 
developed and developing countries.  
 
The aim of this project was to develop a framework to leverage KMS to improve 
security awareness within an organisation context. To accomplish this, an extensive 
literature review was also conducted on Knowledge Management and KMS. 
Knowledge Management involves many processes that have effects on successful 
implementation of KMS. Therefore it was necessary to have a clear understanding of 
these processes. Moreover it was necessary to conduct a literature review on KMS so 
as to ascertain key features that could be leveraged for improving security awareness 
within an organisation.  
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Using this, an assessment of knowledge activities and features of KMS that were 
suitable for improving security awareness was conducted. The assessment revealed 
knowledge storing and sharing of Knowledge Management processes, and the 
collaborative and repository features of KMS could be effectively used to improve 
security awareness among employees within an organisation.  
 
Based on the results from literature reviews and survey, a framework to leverage KMS 
to improve security awareness was developed. The framework is an open framework 
that can be deployed in any organisation as guidance in implementing KMS for 
improving security awareness. The framework was evaluated by security experts and 
proved to be applicable in an organisation context.  
 
Following the evaluation of the framework, a prototype of KMS was developed using 
Wiki collaborative tool. The aim of the prototype was to assess the usefulness of KMS 
on improving security awareness. Many security experts and academic users, 
specifically from Africa were invited to participate in the Wiki. Security experts were 
invited to monitor the content of the Wiki during implementation, while users were 
invited to assess the usefulness of KMS in raising their awareness on computer 
security.  
 
Although the time was limited, the results obtained reflect the positive effects on using 
KMS to improve security awareness. Moreover, users from Africa were considered as 
good system evaluators because, as the survey results revealed, they are not familiar 
with computer threats. Therefore, KMS will have a direct impact on their knowledge 
based on computer threats. 
8.4 Experimentation, Evaluation and Lim itation  
The survey conducted as part of this research aimed to investigate the roles of users in 
computer security and the effectiveness of security awareness programmes in 
educating users on computer related issues. The survey was conducted in three phases. 
Phase one was conducted during the ICITST seminar which was conducted on 23rd 
June 2008. The second phase was conducted in Tanzania on mid July 2008 which 
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resulted to an extension of the survey to other developing countries such as Kenya and 
Uganda. The final phase was conducted online. Results obtained from the survey were 
then evaluated by security experts through a face-to-face interview.  
 
There are many countries that fall under categorisation of developing countries, but 
due to time limit this survey only concentrated with three countries which are 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, for the developed countries only those 
countries of the attendees of ICITST 2008 were considered. This limited the range of 
countries considered during this research however the countries considered can be 
considered suitable representatives of their categorisation. 
 
Though the result obtained was enough for the development of the framework, still 
there was limitation on the number of audiences. The response rate from audience was 
relatively poor especially for online survey. Many audiences were invited to participate 
in online survey but only few responded to the invitation and only very few completed 
the survey. Moreover, the survey was conducted in mid June, which was during 
summer break. Therefore it was difficult to distribute questionnaires and there were 
many out-of-office notification emails. 
 
Following the results obtained from literature review and survey, a framework was 
developed to guide the implementation of KMS to improve security awareness in an 
organisational context. The framework was then evaluated for its applicability by 
security expert. Thereafter, a Wiki-based prototype was implemented to evaluate the 
usefulness of KMS in improving security awareness. The prototype was both evaluated 
by security experts and users from Africa. Security expert was for evaluation of the 
prototype during its implementation while users were for evaluating the contribution 
on their security related knowledge. 
 
Due to limitation of internet accessibility, the response from users was relatively poor.  
This led to limited results during evaluation. To prove the contribution of KMS in 
improving security awareness a longer timeframe, potentially of years, is required. 
However, the results obtained from this project have contributed sufficient results to 
merit more investigation that have already been set a clear, validated pathway to 
continue. 
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8.5 Future  Work & Research  
There are many countries that fall under categorisation of developing countries, but 
due to time limit this survey only concentrated with three countries which are 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Therefore, it is a recommendation of this project to 
extend this investigation and include more countries that fall under developing so as to 
gain more insights on their understanding of digital threats and their possible causes. 
 
A valuable extension of this research would be to pick Tanzania as a sample country in 
developing countries and implement a more functional Wiki based KMS that can be 
accessible to the public so as to monitor their progress on gain new insights into 
cultural aspects of digital threats and use the experience and findings to expand this 
same strategy to other developing countries. 
 
 In an organisational context, it would be interesting to implement a similar Wiki-
based KMS in a series of organisations of various organisation, technical and security 
cultures and to monitor the progress of users in gaining new insights on digital threats. 
The findings of such research would be extremely useful in assessing the robustness of 
the framework developed by this research and allow it to be extended to  be applicable 
and useful to a broader base. Thereafter it would be possible to extend this research to 
recommend a series of KMS which could be implemented based on organisational 
profiles.  
8.6 Conc lusion  
This project highlighted the usefulness of KMS in improving security awareness in an 
organisational context. From literature review and supporting survey responses, user 
involvement in computer security decisions was discovered to be very poor. Based on 
these findings, a framework was developed to guide the implementation of KMS in 
improving security awareness. Thereafter a Wiki-based prototype was implemented to 
evaluate the contributions of KMS in improving security awareness.   
 
Moreover, the survey revealed the gap of computer security perceptions between 
developed and developing countries. This has produced another area of potential 
research which could be exploiting and extending the findings of this project. 
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The aim of this survey is to investigate the potential roles users play in information systems 
security and the effects security user awareness programmes have in educating users on relevant 
security issues. 
  
All your answers will be confidentially treated. Neither I, Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) 
nor any other third party will record your name, email address or any other details that might 
lead to your identification.   
  
On behalf of Dublin Institute of Technology, I would like to thank you for your contribution in 




Organisational and Personal Information 























     
 




Q2.   How big is your organisation in terms of the number of employees? 
 
Less than 100 100 – 499 500 – 999 1000 - 4999 5000 – 9999 More than 10000 
      
 
Q3.   In which country is your organisation located? 
 
        ________________________________ 
 




Q4.   In your opinion, how dependant is your organisation’s operations on computer systems? 
         
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 






Q5.    What best describes your role in your organisation? 
         CIO for Chief Information Officer, CTO for Chief Technology Officer, CSO for Chief Security Officer 












     
 




Q6.    What is your experience in information systems security? 
 
No experience 1 – 5 yrs 6 – 9 yrs 10 – 15 yrs More than 15 yrs 
     
 
 
Q7.   Do you have any security professional qualification?  
 
Yes No 
   
        If your answer is “No”, please go to section two. 
 
Q8.    What security professional qualification(s) do you possess? 
 
CISA CISM CISSP ISSAP ISSMP ISSEP CAP SSCP 
        
 




Q9.   With your security professional qualification(s), do you think it has helped to raise awareness of 
your role in/responsibilities for security within your organisation?  
 
Yes No Don’t know 
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        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 10. 
 
Q10.   In your opinion, how much has your security professional qualification(s) helped you to 
contribute to your organisation’s information systems security? 
 
Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 







Roles of users in information systems’ security 
Q1.   Are there any security policies in your organisation? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 






        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 2, 4, 15, 16 and 17. 
 
Q2.   In your opinion, how involved are end-users in establishing security policies in your organisation? 
         
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 






Q3.  Is there any roles/designation other than administrators that requires computer administrative 
privileges to perform their tasks? 
         
Yes No Don’t know 
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Q4. Does your organisation's security policy include policy on restrictions of applications installation?? 
         
Yes No Don’t know 






Q5.   In your opinion, how involved are users in operating your organisation’s computer systems? 
         
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 






Q6.   In your opinion, how involved are users in designing your organisation’s information systems? 
         
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 






Q7.   In your opinion, how involved are users in developing your organisation’s information systems? 
         
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 






Q8.   In your opinion, how involved are users in configuring your organisation’s information systems? 
         
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 
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Q11. Do you think it is necessary to educate end-users on information systems security matters? 


























Q13. Do you think it is necessary to educate IT Personnel on information systems security matters?    
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Q14.   In your opinion, how interactive are IT Personnel with end-users? 
 
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 







Q15.   In your opinion, how much do end-users adhere with security policies within your organisation? 
 
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 







Q16. In your opinion, how much do IT Personnel adhere with security policies within your 
organisation? 
 
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 







Q17.  In your opinion, how contributive security policies are in ensuring security of your organisation's 
information systems? 
 
Don’t know Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 







Q18.  Does your organisation have any motivation scheme to attract end-users to practice good security  
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SECTION III 
Impact of Security User Awareness Programmes 
Q1.    Does your organisation have any security user awareness programme? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 






        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please go to question 10, 12 and 13. 
 
Q2.   What form of security user awareness programme(s) does your organisation practice? 
 
Web-based Posters Presentations Email Face-to-face Don’t know 
      
 
Others (Please specify) 
 
 
Q3.  Does your organisation’s security user awareness programme(s) go beyond awareness of security 
policies? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 





        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 4. 
 
Q4.  If it goes beyond awareness of security policies, do you think it matches with the dynamic nature 
of computer security threats? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 
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Q5.    Are IT personnel among the targeted users of your security user awareness programme(s)? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 






        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 7. 
 
Q6.  In your opinion, how responsive are end-users to security user awareness programme(s)? 
 
Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 





Q7.  In your opinion, how responsive are IT Personnel to security user awareness programme(s)? 
 
Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 





Q8.   Does your security user awareness programmes contribute to a decrease in information systems 
security attacks? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 






Q9.   In your opinion, how relevant are security user awareness materials to the targeted users within 
your organisation? 
 
Don’t know Irrelevant Moderate Relevant 
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Q10.  Does your organisation have computer security logging activated? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 





        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 11. 
 
Q11.  Does your security user awareness programme(s) material consider audited/logged information? 
  
Yes No Don’t know 






Q12.  In your country, are there any legal requirements for educating users in security issues? 
 
Yes No Don’t know 
   
 
If yes, please specify: 
 
 
        If your answer is “No” or “Don’t know”, please skip question 13. 
 
Q13. In your opinion, how much do legal requirements contribute to the security of organisation’s 
information systems?  
 
Not at all Very low Low Medium High Very high 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Q1.   “Users’ involvement in security policy establishment is directly proportional to their
adherence with security policies.” 
 






Q2.  What is your opinion on consulting users when preparing security awareness
materials? 
 






Q3.  “Clear understanding of organizational culture determines the successfulness of
security awareness programme”  
 






Q4.   “The level of computerization in an organization determines the understandability of
information security”  
 






Q5. “Clear understanding of organizational security culture determines the
successfulness of security awareness programme”  
 













If you remember early July this year you helped me with the completion of security
awareness survey. It is my honor to acknowledge your contributions. 
 
The survey was globally hence many countries participated including USA, UK, China,
Germany, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and many other countries.  
 
However, it is sad to say from all these countries, including our neighbors Kenya and
Uganda, our country is the least in computer security understanding.  
 
Following this finding, I have developed a collaborative Knowledge Management System
that will enable us to raise our understanding on computer security relevant issues. The
system is easy to use and allows you to add and edit any page as you wish, attach
documents and above all it enables us to conduct discussions. 
 
This system is designed to operate in an organization environment. However, due to
computer security being a national problem, its accessibility with time, will eventually be
made public to citizens so as they can also participate in security knowledge sharing thus
raise their computer security awareness. 
  
Though the system is in its dawn, with your cooperation we can make it successfully
inherited in our society. Participate in this motivation and you will eventually enjoy the
fruits of your participation. Let us join power and take this responsibility of educating our
nation about security issues.  
 
You may wonder why there are so many dead links, but this is to make you play your
part. I have chosen my wing, so you choose yours or go along with me. I welcome your
comments about the page, and if you find anything that is missing you can add it. 
 
Following this welcome note, I’ll send each member their login credentials individually. 
 
Thanks very much. 
 
Regards,   
